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MUST EMPLOYERS PAY FOR VIAGRA?
AN AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
ANALYSIS
POST-BRA GDON AND SUTTON
Stephen T. Kaminski

INTRODUCTION
Bob Dole promotes it. Comedians swear by it. The head of Bear
Stems donated $1 million of it to the poor.' After gaining approval
from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
1997, 2Pfizer's orally ingested erectile dysfunction (ED) combatant,
Viagra, immediately commanded the world's attention. While men
blush contentedly at the sight of the expensive little blue pills, health
maintenance organizations (IIOs), traditional insurance companies,
and state Medicaid suppliers cringe. Considerations regarding coverage
by insurance providers dominate Viagra-related debates in the healthcare arena. In contradistinction, this article focuses on a Viagracentered issue that has garnered significantly less attention to date.
Legal action based on the core of this exposition, however, possesses
the potential to impact greatly the fields of health care, employment,
and disability discrimination law.

Bachelor of Science degree, Johns Hopkins University, 1997. Juris Doctor dc-rcc,
Harvard Law School, 2000. Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Judge Arthur J. Gajar-sa, United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2000-2001.
'See Financier Giving to Poor Si Million Worth of iagra, CH. Trtia,, June 11, 1993,
at 3.
2

See id-
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I discuss the likelihood of employer liability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)3for refusing to provide employees with
insurance plans that cover Viagra. Making the assumption that non
self-insured employers may optionally purchase Viagra coverage from
outside insurers, this article focuses on whether employers must fill
their employees' pockets with Pfizer's wonder-drug. I attempt to
delineate the obstacle-ridden path that an employee must endure to
successfully recover his Viagra costs pursuant to a disability
discrimination-based lawsuit against an employer who refuses to
provide the drug.
Section I of this exposition introduces basic topics needed to
comprehend fully the issue at hand: ED; Viagra; typical insurer Viagra
policies, including optional coverage programs; and the ADA
generally, and its sections salient to this discussion specifically.
Section II considers the statutory question that a court must address
prior to commencing a disability discrimination analysis: Does an
individual stricken with ED qualify as "disabled" under the ADA in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bragdon v. Abbot and
in Sutton v. United Air Lines? Finally, assuming arguendo that ED
sufferers are statutorily "disabled," Section III illustrates the remainder
of the process and pitfalls that an ED-plagued man presumably will
encounter pursuant to an ADA challenge against his employer who
refuses to provide Viagra coverage.
THE BASICS
A proper analysis of whether the ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, requires employers to provide Viagra coverage for their
employees necessitates a basic understanding of ED and its frequent
conqueror, Viagra. Further, a summary of the current status of
legislative and judicial trends surrounding insurance companies'
standard Viagra policies is important to this discussion since I assume
throughout the course of this paper that non self-insured employers
may purchase Viagra coverage from insurers under optional-rider
provisions. This section introduces each of these topics and concludes

342 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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by outlining the history of the ADA and its Title I proscription against
disability discrimination in the employment field.
An Erectile Dysfunction Primer
Generally, an erection occurs after sexual arousal, when a man's brain
transmits a signal commanding the blood vessels within his male organ
to relax.4 Immediately thereafter blood enters rapidly, causing his male
organ to swell, while simultaneously compressing outflow veins that
restrict the exit of blood.5 In sum, these events produce an erection."
ED generally results from impairment to a man's arterial (blood
flow) system or nervous system. 7 The commonly accepted definition
of ED, propounded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
however, broadly characterizes ED as the inability to attain or maintain
an erection sufficient for intercourse, regardless of the precursor
impairment.3 Employing this definition, the NIH estimates that ten to
thirty million men in the United States suffer from ED, 9 including
approximately five percent of forty-year old men, and between fifteen
and twenty-five percent of men at age sixty-five.' 0 The prevalence of
ED among American men results from a wide variety of precursor
conditions, including prostate surgery, diabetes mellitus, hypertension,
vascular disease, high cholesterol, drug use, neurogenic disorders, renal
failure and dialysis, and smoking." Each such condition increases a
man's likelihood of contracting ED. 12

4
See generally Pfizer Canada: Erectile Dysfunction Resource Centre for Consunmers, at
http://www.edfactscanada.comlSrrE/consumer-under3OICN7-3.html (last Nisited Spltemb.r 7,

1999).

5

1d

6
See
7

id.
See Pfizer Canada: Erectile Dysfunction Resource Centre for Consumers. at

http:/ivww.edfactseanada.com/SITElconsumersfunder3OfCN5-3.htmli (last visited Septembzr 7,
1999).
sSee National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement tDea

7-9. 1992), at http://text.nlm.nih.govnihcdcf%,Tww91lM.html (last visited Oa. 20, 1999)
[hereinafter Conference Statement].
9
See id.; see also ViagraProductInformation: Erectile Dysfitnctton, It's Common And
Treatable,at http://vwv.viagra.com/consumer/3a.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 1999).
' 0 While the percentage of ED-positive men increases progressively vith ae, it is not an
inevitable consequence of aging. See ConferenceStatement, supra note S.

"Other factors include: hypogonadism in association with a number of endocrinolo.ic
conditions, low levels of high density lipoprotein, Peyronie's diseae, priapism. depreion.
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While modem scientists now proffer technical explanations of
ED's underlying sources, the anguish suffered by ED victims and
resultant attempts at a "quick fix" reach back to antiquity. For
thousands of years, philosophers, naturalists, bishops, and crackpots
advocated miracle cures, from dried black ants with olive oil to melted
fat from camel humps to concoctions including crushed rubies, gold
dust, and whale vomit.' 3 In the mid-1900's, sexual aids such as acrylic
implants and vacuum-pump technology appeared. 14 Finally, in 1995,
the FDA approved the first prescription anti-ED drug - Upjohn's
Caverject®, which requires an interpenile injection. 15 Vivus' MUSE,
administered via intraurethral insertion of a micropellet, and surgical
procedures such as penile implants and vascular surgery also pre-dated
Viagra.16 But these often uncomfortable, complicated products and
expensive, intimidating procedures left the market door wide open for
an orally ingested drug that would provide similar results.
Viagra: The Wonder-Drug
As early as 1992, Pfizer began to develop an oral drug, sildenafil, for
the treatment of angina - a chest pain afflicting heart patients.1" While
the drug failed to alleviate significantly angina patients' suffering,
those stricken with ED reported sustained erections while consuming
sildenafil. 18 These reports prompted Pfizer to investigate the effects
resulting from ED victims' ingestion of sildenafil, now commonly
known as Viagra.19 After Pfizer's lengthy clinical studies and a six-

alcohol ingestion, lack of sexual knowledge, poor sexual techniques. inadequate or deteriorated
interpersonal
relationships, and many chronic diseases. See id.
121d.
3
1 See Joseph Hooper, Sex Science Timeline, MEN'S JOURNAL (HEALTH AND FITNESS: SEx
SPECIAL: BEYOND VIAGRA)(August, 1998), availableat
http://vww.usrf.org./breakingnews/timeline.html.
14See id.
"56See id.
1 Other pre-Viagra therapies include: androgen replacement therapy for patients with

testicular failure and psychotherapy as a remedy for primarily non-organic ED. See Conference
Statement, supra note 8.
7
See Hooper, supra note 13.
"8See id.
9

See id.
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month priority review, 20 the FDA approved Viagra on March 27,
1997.21

Viagra, an orally ingested tablet, affects a man's response to
sexual stimulation by increasing blood flow to the male organ, resulting
in a greater likelihood of producing an erection. 2 Despite notable side
effects such as heart problems, blurred vision, urinary tract infections,

and reports of at least 130 deaths linked to Viagra in its first two years
on the market,2 the clamoring for Pfizer's non-painful sexual stimulant

incited physicians to write more than ten million Viagra prescriptions
for approximately five million men in less than two and a half years. 2 4
While this article focuses on Viagra coverage, a similar analysis will
20

See THE PINK SHE. VOL. 60, Iss. 13 (March 30, 1993) [hereinafter Piu- SHErT],
Pfizer's clinical trials involved the administration of Viagra to more tian 3,000
patients, aged 19 to 87 years, with ED of various etiologies, for a mean of ite '.ear;
S e
Pfizer Viagra® (sildenafil citrate), the FDA 4pproved Impotence Pill, arailable tit
http://www.viagra.com/hcppropack-insert.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 1991 [hereinafter
Package Insert]. The clinical tests report: in a study of 263 diabetes patients, 57'a of Viaera
patients reported improved erections compared to 10% of patients on a placebo. vith 4'V% of
intercourse attempts successful versus 12% on a placebo; in a study of 178 spinal cord patient.
83% of Viagra patients reported improved erections compared to 12% of patients on a placebo.
with 59% of intercourse attempts succesful versus 13% on a placebo; ina study of 179
patients with psychogenic etiology of dysfunction, 34% of Viagra patients reported improved
erections compared to 26% on a placebo, with 70% of intercourse attempts succc,-.ful versus
29% on a placebo; and in a study of patients that had undergone a radial pro. tateetomy. 43%
of Viagra patients reported improved erections compared to 15% on a placebo Sce PINIt SHEET.
supra note 20.
22Pfizer reports Viagra's precise clinical mechanism of action as follov.s- -[The
physiologic mechanism of erection of the penis involves release of nitric oide (NO)in the
corpus cavernosum during sexual stimulation. NO then activates the enzyme gua.mvlate
cyclase, which results in increased levels of cyclic guanosine mono phosphate (cGMPt.
producing smooth muscle relaxation in the corpus cavemosum and alloving inflow of bluoI
Sildenafil has no direct relaxant effect on isolated human corpus ca%emosum. but enhance: the
effect of NO by inhibiting phosphodiesterase ty.pe 5 (PDES), v.hich is responsible for
degradation of cGMP in the corpus cavemosum. When sexual stimulation causezs local relcae
of NO, inhibition of PDE5 by sildenafil causes increased levels of cGMP in the corpus
cavemosum, resulting in smooth muscle relaxation and inflow of blood to the corpus
cavernosum." See Package Insert, supra note 21.
23Viagra is potentially fatal to men taking nitrate-based heart medication. Sce eg ,
Vasomax May Deflate Interest in Viagra: Impotence Drug Offers Quieh Results.
TIMlES.
Jan. 6, 1999, at Al. After consultation with the FDA, on November 24, 193 . the FDA
announced that Pfizer updated its Viagra labels and package inserts to include varnines of
potential cardiac risk to users with preexisting cardiovascular diseaze. So Pjfizer Ushates
Viagra Warning, ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL Lrri. REP., December 1990, at 15
_4See Viagra Product Information: Erectile Dysfunction" It's Common aind Troatabl,
available at http:/www.viagra.comfconsumerl3a.htm (last visited Sept 21, 1999),
21
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presumably apply to competitors' upcoming products, inspired by
projected annual Viagra sales in the billions.25 Potential competitors to
Pfizer's Viagra include: Vasomax,2 6licensed to Schering-Plough by
Zonagen; Uprima, the joint project of Takeda Chemical Industries and
and IC351, a collaboration of Eli Lilly and the
Abbot Laboratories;
27
Corporation.
ICOS
Viagra Coverage Policies
This article centers on whether employers must provide Viagra for its
employees under the ADA via self-insurance or by way of payment to
outside insurers. Because I assume that non self-insured employers
may optionally purchase Viagra coverage from insurers, this discussion
necessitates an introduction to the current status of outside insurers'
Viagra policies. I also discuss the applicable political and legal trends
that, while still in their infancy, may soon bear on the issue at hand.
Typical Outside Insurer Viagra Policies
Insurers widely disagree on the extent of Viagra coverage to provide.
On one hand, insurers such as Prudential Insurance Company of
America and Humana, Inc. flatly refuse to cover Viagra because of
safety concerns and Viagra-related deaths. 28 On the other hand, several
insurers cover anywhere from four to eight pills per month for
medically qualified members. 29 Between these extremes, several of the
United States' largest insurers offer employers the option to purchase
25

See Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure,and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don't
141 (1998).
Want You
26 to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 119,
As of August 10, 1999, the FDA temporarily suspended clinical human trials of
Vasomax. pursuant to Zonagen's two-year rat study, which indicated a degree of brown fat

tissue higher than in controls. The FDA allowed Zonagen to continue studies seeking to
demonstrate that the rat findings totally relate to the host animal and lack relevance to humans.
The clinical trials are expected to be delayed for approximately six months. See Zonagen
Crashes
27 as FDA Terminates PhentolamineStudies, MARIkETLETrER (August 19, 1999).
See id.
See More Men Suing to Get Health Plans to Cover Viagra, SEATrLE TIMES, March 21,
1999, at
29 Al 1.
28

Insurers' Viagra coverage plans are in flux; therefore, the following figures are subject
to change: As of June 20, 1998, United Healthcare provides eight pills per month, CignaHealth
covers six pills per month, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rochester, NY, pays for six pills
per month for patients suffering from ED for more than six months. See Kaiser Permanente
Latest Providerto Reject Viagra Coverage, AUGUSTA CHRON., June 20, 1998, at A 1l.
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riders for Viagra coverage. 30 The optional-rider format closely imitates
programs developed and still utilized by many insurers for
contraceptive coverage. 31 The program offered by Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, which covers nearly 14 million people, aptly illustrates a
typical optional-rider plan for Viagra coverage.3 2 Aetna's policy offers
Viagra coverage only to employers of fifty or more workers and only at
an additional cost to the employer.33 Increases in employer premiums
depend on the quantity of pills an employer agrees to provide and the
level of employee co-pay. 4 For example, in addition to its standard
plan, an Aetna-insured employer with one hundred workers must spend
$1,884 per year to cover six pills every thirty-four days, if each
benefiting employee pays one half of the prescription cost.35 Without
an employee co-payment, the cost for the same employer
to cover
3
6
annually.
$7,080
to
rises
days
thirty-four
every
twelve pills
Legislative and JudicialTrends Affecting OutsideInsurer
Viagra Policies
This article's salience hinges in part on the continued existence of
optional-rider programs available to employers from outside insurers
for Viagra coverage. If legislative or judicial action mandates insurers
to provide Viagra coverage, non self-insuring employers who provide
employees with health insurance necessarily will cover Viagra,
mooting this article's significance to all but self-insured employers.
Currently, many outside insurers offer optional-rider Viagra
programs. 37 At least four recent developments, however, suggest that
momentum is building toward requiring outside insurers to cover
Viagra: the erosion of contraceptive optional-rider programs,
California's dismissal of an optional-rider program covering Viagra,
30

For example, Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield provides Viagra coverage only to
employers with more than forty-nine employees at an additional cost to the employer via an
optional policy rider. See Bus. INs., Aug. 9, 1999, at 20.
31
See Aetna to Allow Coveragefor Viagra, AP ONLINE, June 23. 199S.
32
33See id
See Diane Levick, Aetna Sets Add-On Fees for I'iagra Coverage; PrudntialCites
Safety 34
in Refusing Coverage, HARTFORD COUFtANT. July 3. 1998. at DI.
See il
35
See id. Viagra typically costs Sl0 per pill retail. See Diane Levick. InsurersS!a:ng
Riders36to Cover Viagra Costs, HARTFORD COuRANT, July 29, 1993. at D2,
See Levick, supra note 33.
37See id
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results of the first Viagra-specific judicial opinion, and Medicaid's
Viagra coverage mandate. While these events certainly fail to assure
the demise of optional-rider Viagra coverage policies, I briefly outline
each development to set this article into its proper context.
ContraceptiveCoverage
At first glance, the endurance of long-standing oral contraceptive
optional-rider plans offered by many insurers suggests that similar
Viagra programs are sound. In October 1998, however, a federal
employee contraception coverage amendment attached to a $13.4
billion spending bill successfully passed through Congress and the
White House. 38 This law requires health plans providing benefits to
federal employees to provide five types of contraceptives to federally
employed civilian women of childbearing age, if the plans also cover
prescription drugs. 39 While primarily symbolic and born only after a
bill seeking to reimburse fully all women for FDA approved
contraceptives failed,40 the federal employee contraception coverage
amendment suggests a weakening in support for optional-rider
contraception coverage programs.
California'sDismissalof an Optional-RiderProgram
State regulators possess the power to dismiss optional-rider programs
and mandate insurers to cover Viagra. 41 On December 31, 1998, the
California Department of Corporations (DOC), which regulates HMOs
in California, dismissed a Viagra rider option offered by Kaiser
Permanente. 42 This move required the nation's largest HMO 4 to cover
3

8See, e.g., Stephanie Barr, Birth Control, Not Money, Was Key in One Budget Battle,
WASH. 39POST, Oct. 19, 1998, at A19.
See id.
40
See, e.g., Jan Ziegler, The Gender Gap: Health Care'sNext Frontier,BUS. & f-;ALTil.
Nov. 1998,
at 29.
41
See State Issues Decision on Kaiser Request to Exclude Prescription Benefits for
Sexual Dysfunction, STATE OF CAL. DEPT. OF CORP. NEWS RELEASE 98-24, December 31, 1998,
available
42 at http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrellnr9824.htm.
Additionally, Kaiser agreed to pay the state of California $250,000 to help cover the
department's investigation costs; agreed to resolve currently pending grievances; and agreed to

inform each of its members that received a Viagra prescription, from the date of FDA approval
until Kaiser added Viagra to its formulary, about Kaiser's current policy and to resolve any
grievances that result. See State Closes Investigation ofKaiser's PrescriptionPractices,STArE
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Viagra in California. 44 California DOC Commissioner Dale Bonner45
determined that Kaiser's optional-rider program for Viagra limited
access to a "medically necessary" drug.4 6 Generally indicating
treatment recognized as appropriate in reference to community

standards or to applicable medical beliefs without rising to the level of
"essential," most states - including California - require insurers to
cover "medically necessary" drugs and treatments.4 Following in
California's footsteps, New York and Connecticut reversed Kaiser's
Viagra optional-rider policy.4 On the other49hand, twelve states and the
District of Columbia approved the program.

The First Viagra-SpecificJudicialOpinion
Subsequent to initial Viagra coverage decisions by insurers, plaintiffs'
lawyers, unsatiated ED victims, and even a federal judge spawned a
barrage of lawsuits attacking insurers who announced policies refusing
to cover Viagra
or covering "too few" pills per month for ED sufferers'
"needs." 50 In Sibley-Schreiber v.Oxford Health Plans, the Eastern
OF CAL. DEPT. OF CORP. NEWs RELEASE 93-23. December 23, 1993. aradable at
http:lvww.corp.ca.gov/pressrellnr9S23.htm.
43
Kaiser Permanente covers 9.1 million people in total and 5.7 million California
residents. See Eileen Glanton, Biggest HMO Won't Cover 'iaqgra, Says ItIsn't a Medhcal
Necessity, BuFF.NEws, June 20, 1993, at A12; Rhonda L. Rundle, KaiserSecs Hl(?:crRates in
Wake of Viagra Ruling, WALL ST. J., January 4, 1999, at A14.
4'The California DOC is considering Viagra coverage exclusion requea. from Blue
Cross of California, Pacificare of California, CIGNA HealthCare, Health Net, Aetna Inc. and
Greater Pacific. See California Says Kaiser Can't Cover iagra Under
Wdcr.
Rrd:etal
MANAGED
CAE
WEEK,
January
11,
1999
[hereinafter
MANAGED
CAREJ,
45
Dale Bonner relinquished his position as California DOC Commissioner on De2eCeb2r
31, 1998. See California Department of Corporations, ;1 Iessaqe from the .ktinCommissioner
(visited Sept. 23, 1999). at http:Ivww.corp.cagovlaboutus-him
4
6rhe California DOC mandates that HMOs such as Kaiser, in addition to cov ering drug2s
on its formulary that are prescribed by physicians, must pay for non-formularn drugs that are
"medically necessary." See State Closes Investigation ofKaiser 'sPrescriptionPractices,supra
note 42. The California DOC determined that Kaiser could require a 569% co-payment for
Viagra. See MANAGED CARE, supra note 44.
47
4 See Beh, supra note 25, at 133.

'SeeidZ

49

See Jan Greene, Al Wfants More Hair.Less Fat,and a Better Sex Life and lie Wants
His Health Plan to Payfor It. HOSPITALS & HEALT NEWoriKS, March 1. 1999., at 36
50
See, e.g., Harrow v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America. No. 93-2404 IJWH) $D.N.1
filed May 21, 1998); Scholl v. QualMed Inc., No. 93-4963 (ED.Pa- filed Sept 16, 1993)
(class-action suit filed by a federal bankruptcy judge in Philadelphia on behalf of all federal
employees seeking to force his HMO, QualMed, to provide more than four pills per month).
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District of New York - the first and only court to address the issue to
date - denied defendant Oxford's motion to dismiss the class-action
plaintiffs' complaint. 51 Oxford alleged the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
the insurer's self-designated administrative procedures before filing
suit.5 2 The court pointed to § 503(2) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), stating: "Exhaustion of the statutorily
required administrative process is not always required. Most notably,
exhaustion is excused where claimants make a clear and positive
showing that pursuing available administrative remedies would be
futile. 5 3 Because Oxford clearly communicated its "no exceptions"
Viagra policy to the plaintiffs,54 Judge Dearie determined the plaintiffs'
failure to exhaust Oxford's administrative process met ERISA's
"futility" exception. 55 Consequently, the court denied Oxford's motion
to dismiss. 56 While it did not reach the salient issue of whether
Oxford's policy wrongfully denied plaintiffs of Viagra coverage under
ERISA,57 the court's notable hostility toward the insurer at least
indicates its willingness to hear Viagra coverage cases.
MedicaidCoverage of Via.ra
Since July 2, 1998, state Medicaid programs 58 have been required to
cover Viagra to retain eligibility for certain Medicaid rebates.5 9 The
Hittle v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 98-4969 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 17, 1998); Lentini v.
Humana Inc., No 98-5896 Div. H, 13th Cir, (Hillsborough Co., Fla. filed Aug. 5, 1998).
5
Sibley-Schreiber v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 1999 WL 669396 (E.D. N.Y.
1999).
52
53See id.
See Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir, 1993),
cited in54Sibley-Schreiber, supra note 51, at *6.
On May 1, 1998, Oxford stopped paying for Viagra until it announced its final policy;
on June 15, 1998, Oxford announced its final policy: insurer payment for six Viagra pills per
month, regardless of the number of pills prescribed by a physician. See Sibley-Schreiber, supra

note 5 1, at *1.
55
See id.
56
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at *4.
57
Plaintiffs claim that defendants denied them benefits in violation of the ERISA
provisions codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994). See id.
at * 1.
58
Medicaid is a public insurance program, with responsibilities shared by the federal
government and states. It provides coverage for 36 million poor and disabled Americans,
including 4 million men.

See, e.g., Health Care Financing Administration: Medicaid, at

http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid (last visited Sept. 10, 2000).
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Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) - the federal agency
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
responsible for overseeing Medicaid - determined federal law requires
Medicaid providers to purchase Viagra.
Pursuant to the Omnibus
6
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 1which established the Social

Security Act's drug rebate program,' 2state Medicaid programs must
cover all FDA approved prescription drugs for their medically accepted
indications, which are distributed by manufacturers who have entered
into drug rebate agreements. 63

Specific drugs excepted from this

mandate include drugs utilized for anorexia, for weight loss or weight
gain, for cosmetic purposes or hair growth, for the symptomatic relief
of cough and colds, and for the promotion of fertility or smoldng
cessation. 64 Notably, the HCFA determined Viagra fails to constitute a

fertility-promoting drug.65 Prompted by Congress, however, the HCFA
urged vigorous Viagra-use monitoring in a request sent to states

because the Secretary, upon determination that a drug is subject to
clinical abuse or inappropriate use, may then properly add that drug to
the list of exceptions.

The Americans with Disabilities Act
Prior to 1990, only the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" 7and the Fair
Housing Act as amended in 1988 6Sprovided federal statutory protection
"For example, Wisconsin would jeopardize $31 million per year had it not approved
coverage. Wisconsin estimated the cost of providing Medicaid coverage of Viagra at $250, 0
per year. See Medicaid Viagra Cost Estimates Overstatedat Least 10-Fold - Pfjtzr.TilE PRI-1
SHEET VOL. 60, Iss. 44 (Nov. 2, 1998).
60
6 1See id
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No, 101-500. 104 Stat, 132'u
62
Social Security Act (Old Age Pension Act) of 1935 § 1927 42 U.SC° § 139br-o
(1994).
63
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S (1994).
6'States may also exclude: prescription vitamins and mineral products feveept prenatal
vitamins and fluoride preparations); nonprescription drugs; barbituates; benzodiazepinea; and
drugs on which a manufacturer conditions sales on a requirement that aw2oeiated telz or
monitoring devices be purchased exclusively from the manufacturer or its de .uIC S:e 42
U.S.C.65§ 1396r-S(d)(2) (1994).
See Letter from Sally K. Richardson, Director, Center fo~r Aedicald ard State
Operations, to State Medicaid
Directors
(Nov. 30. ! (9 ). at atlabe at
http'I.Avww.hcfa.gov/medicaidlsmdl 1130S.htm. See also Everythukn Into the Brakt Po!,
PHARMACEuriCAL
EXEcuTivE, December 1, 1998, at 36.
6

'See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(d)(3) (1994).
U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
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to disabled individuals. Neither statute, however, comprehensively
mandates the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act only proscribes discrimination by
federal agencies and federal assistance recipients. 69 The Fair Housing
Act only forbids discrimination in the realm of housing. 70 This dearth
of protection motivated Congress to investigate thoroughly the status of
disability discrimination in the United States. In 1989, the Senatorial
Committee on Labor and Human Resources found that "discrimination
against some 43 million Americans with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations,
education, transportation, communication, institutionalization, health
services, recreation, voting, and access to public services., 71 Further,
the Committee determined that "unlike individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have 72 often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination."
Pursuant to these findings, Congress acknowledged the need for
an exhaustive federal proscription on discrimination against disabled
individuals, 73 and thus, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) was born. 74 Designed to "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities" by providing "clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards," 75the ADA proffers, inter alia, sweeping
76
protection to disabled individuals from employment discrimination.
Congress directed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to administer and provide guidance in the interpretation of the
77
ADA's employment provisions.
6842 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
69
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
70
See Susan M. Gibson, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct ProtectsIndividuals with a
History of Cancerfrom Employment Discrimination: Myth or Reality, 16 HOFSmRA LAB, LJ.
167, 170 (1998).
7'42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
721Id.
73

See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 5 (1989).
§§ 12101-12213 (1994).
7'42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
76
See id.
77
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994).
7442 U.S.C.
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Title I of the ADA provides the general rule against disability
discrimination by employers: "No covered entity shall discriminate

against a qualified individual 78with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 7"'
Statutory terminology, legislative history, implementing regulations,
and case law interpretation all undeniably indicate that an employee's
fringe benefits, including employer-provided health benefits, are among
the "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 0 The ADA

prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of disability in
health insurance provisions provided to their employees, both directly

and indirectly. sl That is, the ADA not only bars self-insurers from
discriminating against disabled employees, but also prohibits
employers from participating in contractual or other relationships with
7

&"Qualified individual" describes "an individual with a disability vho, ',ith or v, thout
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the emploument position

that such individual holds or desires." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994). Thus, a prcon v, ith a
disability is statutorily "qualified" if he maintains the requisite skills, e\perience, and education
for ajob he holds or desires and can perform the essential functions of that job v,ith or t, ithout
reasonable accommodation. See Weiler v. Household Finance Corporation, 101 r-3d 519. 525
(7th Cir. 1996). Notwithstanding certain positions in the pornography industry, an ED-strickn
individual presumably can perform the essential functions of his job with or v ithout reasonable
accommodation, such as Viagra.
7942 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
SOSee, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), 12101(a)(5), 12112(a), 12112(b)12) 11994) (the
term "discriminate" includes discrimination via a relationship with an organization providing
fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity), 12112(b)(4) (1994); H R RU No
4S5(1I), at 59 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 341 ("[E]mployers mak not deny
health insurance coverage ... to an individual based on the person's ... di.sabilhy '); H.R. REP,
No 485(111), at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 491; 29 C.F.R. § 1630,4(i)
(1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b) (199S); EEOC: Interim Guidance on .lpphcatlon of Ab.1 to
Health Insurance, DALY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 724, at 405:7115 (1993). [hereinafter Interim
Guidance] ("[l]t is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of disability aeamst
... [an] individual with a disability in regard to fringe benefits available b, virtue of
employment .... [H]ealth insurance plans provided by an employer to its cnploees, are a
fringe benefit available by virtue of employment."); Gonzales v. Garner Food Ser.ices, Inc.
89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996) ("It is ... undisputed that fringe-benefits., such as
employer-provided health benefits, are one set of the 'terms condition, and pr ileae3, ol
employment' protected from unlawful discrimination under the ADA"), Atwion ' Wiley
Sanders Truck Lines, 45 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1293-94 (M.D. Ala. 1993) ("[TIhe tpe of fringe
benefits which the ADA intended to protect from discrimination are privileges such as h.alth
... benefits
.... ).
"1See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(a) (1993).
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entities such as HMOs or traditional insurers that discriminate against
an employer's own disabled employees.8 2 These provisions apply to
employers engaged 83
in an industry affecting commerce that have fifteen
employees.
or more
ARE ED SUFFERERS "DISABLED" UNDER THE ADA?
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of whether an employer's
Viagra policy 84 discriminates against an ED-stricken employee, a court
entertaining this issue must first determine whether a man with ED
qualifies as "disabled" under the ADA. Overcoming this initial obstacle
involves entering the core of two controversial statutory interpretation
debates: (1) determining whether reproduction constitutes a "major life
activity" under the ADA, and (2) determining the proper role of
mitigating measures in deciding whether a person is "substantially
limited" in a "major life activity." The United States Supreme Court
recently tackled each debate, in Bragdon v. Abbot85 and in Sutton v.
United Air Lines,86respectively.
After delineating the ADA's
"disability" status requirements, this section analyzes an ED sufferer's
prospects of qualifying as a "disabled" individual under the ADA in
light of the Bragdon and Sutton decisions.
The Statutory Definition of "Disabled"
The ADA defines disability as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such
individual;
(B) a record of having such an impairment; or
' 2See id.
3

See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A) (1994). Between the date that the employment provision
of the ADA went into effect - July 26, 1992, and July 25, 1994, the statute applied to
employers
with more than 25 workers. See 20 C.F.R. § 1630.2(c) (199S).
84
This analysis applies to claims against employers who either refuse to pay for an
employee's Viagra prescription or allegedly do not provide "enough" Viagra.
85
86 Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S 624 (1998).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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87
(C) being regarded as having such impairment.

ADA disability definitions (B) and (C) necessarily incorporate
definition (A). That is, the "such an impairment" language of

definitions (B) and (C) comprises "impairments" that "substantially
limit" one or more "major life activities," notwithstanding whether an
individual actually possesses that condition.88 Therefore, to properly
determine whether a currently ED-stricken individual qualifies as

statutorily "disabled," this article need only investigate ADA disability
definition (A). Certainly, however, upon judicial determination that
ED meets the requirements of definition (A), an individual not

currently afflicted with ED, but either having a record of EDZ"or being
regarded as having ED, 90 may qualify as "disabled" under ADA

disability definitions (B) and (C), respectively.
Bragdon v. Abbot
The Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Bragdon v. Abbot directly

impacts the analysis of whether ED constitutes an ADA-defined
"disability" on two accounts. First, the Supreme Court examined ADA

disability definition (A) and promulgated a three-prong test to
determine whether an individual suffering from a given condition
s'42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
s5See id
9
8 An individual maintaining "a record of having such an impairment" generally either
once possessed or once had been misclassified as possessing a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Sce 29 C.F.IL §1b30-21k) 11993); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(iii) (1998). See also Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department, 158
F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998) (referring to the EEOC Technical Assistance Manual for the
ADA. which states that Section (B) of the disability definition is satisfied "if a record relied on
by an employer indicates that the individual has or has had a substantially limiting impairment;
the impairment indicated in the record must be an impairment that w~ould sub-tantially limit one
or more of the individual's major life activities.").
" 0An individual "being regarded as having such impairment" either. (A) poErs3e a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life acet, ittes
but that is
treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; or (B) possesses a phsical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1998); 45 C.FR
84 3 l,)21l )
(1998). See also Ellis v. Mohenis Services Inc., 1993 WL 56447,. at *4 tED Pa Aug 24,
1998) (stating that a court must decide whether the defendants regarded plaintiff as ham ing an
impairment, and whether the impairment, as perceived by the defendants, vould have
substantially limited one or more of his life activities).
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qualifies as statutorily "disabled." 91 Second, the Court concluded that
reproduction satisfies the "major life activity" prong of the three-part
test, and further suggested that the sexual dynamics surrounding
reproduction may also meet this statutory limitation. 92 After discussing
the background and holding of Bragdon, Bragdon's three "disability"
prerequisites from an ED sufferer's perspective will be explored.
In 1994, Sidney Abbot sought dental care at the office of Dr.
Randon Bragdon. 93 On a patient registration form Abbot indicated her
status as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive but
asymptomatic. 94 While conducting a routine dental examination
Bragdon noted that Abbot needed a cavity filled. 95 Pursuant to his
infectious disease policy, Bragdon offered to treat Abbot at a hospital,
but refused to perform the procedure in his office. 96 Bragdon
volunteered to charge her no more than his customary fee for the
97
filling; however, responsibility for hospital expenses rested on Abbot.
Abbot declined Bragdon's proposition and filed suit in federal court
under the ADA.98 Abbot claimed she qualified as statutorily "disabled"
under the ADA because her HIV infection affected her blood and
reproductive systems. 99 Interpreting ADA disability definition (A), the
United States District Court for the District of Maine held: (1) an HIV
infection constitutes a "physical impairment;" (2) reproduction
qualifies as a "major life activity;" and (3) Abbot's ability to reproduce
was "substantially limited."' 00 Consequently, according to the federal
trial court, Abbot qualified as "disabled" under the ADA.'020 ' The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 1

9

See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624.

92See id. at 637-38.
93 See id. at 628.
94

See id.
See id.

95

96

See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.

97

See id.

98

See id.
See id. at 631.
'00See Abbot v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580, 585-86 (D. Me. 1995).
"°'Seeid.
'02See Abbot v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (Ist Cir. 1997).

99
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's
holding an HIV infection constitutes an ADA disability.'0 3 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, analyzed definition (A) of disability
under the ADA in three distinct steps, asldng:
(1) whether the respondent's HIV infection was a
physical impairment;
(2) whether the life activity that the respondent claims is
limited constitutes a major life activity; and
(3) whether the impairment
substantially limited the
04
major life activity.1
In construing this portion of the ADA, Justice Kennedy
recognized the ADA's disability definition is drawn almost verbatim
from the definition of "handicapped individual" included in the
Rehabilitation Act of 19731°'and from the definition of "handicap"
contained in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.0' Congress
also adopted a statutory provision in the ADA commanding: "Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the regulations issued by
federal agencies pursuant to such title."'10 7 Therefore, throughout his
discussion of "physical or mental impairment" and "major life
activity," Justice Kennedy refers to regulations first issued by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1977.2",
These regulations appear unaltered in the current Rehabilitation Act

03
1 The

Supreme Court remanded the case for review on the issue of -. hetkr Brawjon
was warranted in his judgment that the performance of certain invasive procedures on a paltent
in his office would have posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others'* S1', Brq,,an,
524 U.S. at 648.
'04See id. at 631.
'0 'See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
'0 'See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1994).
107Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994),
"OSSee id.
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regulations issued by the HI-S and in the EEOC's current regulations to
implement the equal employment provisions of the ADA.
Physical or Mental Impairment
The first step in a disability determination under the ADA entails a
"physical or mental impairment" analysis. 110 Embracing the HEW
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court in
Bradon defined "physical or mental impairment" under the ADA
as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs; respiratory,
including
speech
organs;
cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional2 or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.''
After a lengthy discussion of the medical consequences of HIV
infection, the majority in Bragdon concluded that HIV qualifies as a
physiological disorder detrimentally affecting the infected person's

'0929 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1 - 1630.16 (1998).
"Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632.
"'Concerned that any specific enumeration might lack comprehensiveness, the HEW
decided against including a list of disorders constituting physical or mental impairments in its
Rehabilitation Act regulations. The commentary accompanying the applicable regulations,
however, contains a representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical
impairments, including "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities,
tuberculosis, drug addiction and alcoholism." See 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), reprinted in 45
C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A, p. 334 (1999).
1"245 C.F.R. § 84.30(2)(i) (1997) (emphasis added).
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hemic and lymphatic systems."13 Therefore, the court holding placed
4
HI infection under the rubric of a statutory "physical impairment.""1
ED as a PhysicalImpairment

While it did not directly address whether ED constitutes an ADA
"impairment," the Supreme Court in Bragdon established that any
physiological disorder or condition "affecting" the reproductive system
satisfies this prong of its ADA "disability" test.115 An ED-stricken
individual by definition cannot engage in sexual intercourse; therefore,
ED - primarily6 an organic, physiological condition - clearly "affects"

reproduction."1
Case law also indicates that ED constitutes a physical impairment.
7 pursuant to a cost reduction
In Farmerv. National Ci , Coiporation,"1
program, National City Corporation (NCC) terminated Farmer, a Vice
President and Assistant General Auditor in its audit department, after
twenty-two years of service. 118 Farmer contended that his termination
stemmed from, inter alia, his "disability" - prostate cancer, or the
effects thereof - impotence (now dubbed ED by the NIH)' ' and
incontinence. 120 Conversely, NCC maintained that Farmer failed to
suffer from an ADA recognized "disability."' 2 1 Citing the definition of
"physical impairment" set forth in the regulations interpreting the ADA
- a definition identical to the HEW regulations relied on by the
Supreme Court in Bragdon - the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio concluded that Farmer suffered a "physical
1

3

Bragdon. 524 U.S. at 637.

" 4See id

USED need not affect a man on a daily basis to constitute a physical impairment. S,-c
Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Center, 155 r3d 775. 7"0 (61h Cir, 1990)
(concluding that the plaintiff was physically impaired due to flare-ups of pustlar pzoriasio. even
though she did not experience flare-ups on a daily basis). Cf. Ejavac v. Hol' Family Health
Plus, 13 F.Supp.2d 737, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (a disease clearly need not produce continuous.
identifiable (to the casual observer) symptoms to constitute an impairment under the ADAI
16The "substantially limits" analysis addresses altemative reproductive techniqucs via
non-intercourse methods; a disorder or condition need only "affect," not vhol eliminate,
reproduction
to constitute an ADA "impairment."
7
1 Farmer v. National City Corporation, 1996 WL 887478 (S,D, Ohio Apr 5. 1l99L
"sSee id.

"91n 1992. the NIH concluded that the term "erectile dysfunction" should replace the
term "impotence." See ConferenceStatement, supra note S.
'20See Farmer,1996 WL 887478 at *5.
121See id
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impairment" under the ADA by virtue of the effects of impotence and
incontinence. 122 Therefore, at least in conjunction with incoitinence,
that ED qualifies as an ADA "physical
the court determined
123
impairment."'
ED as a Mental Impairment
ED generally stems from a primarily organic disorder and therefore
will customarily require a "physical impairment" determination.
Occasionally, however, psychological processes such as depression and
anxiety problems generate ED. 124 Such circumstances demand a
"mental impairment" resolution under the ADA.
Most courts
addressing this issue assume that depression and anxiety qualify as
mental impairments under the ADA and subsequently decide the case
based on a "substantial limitation of a major life activity" analysis.
However, a few courts unqualifiedly state that depression and anxiety
constitute "mental impairments" under the ADA's disability
provisions. 125 Therefore, it seems probable that psychologically
' 12
generated ED qualifies an ADA defined "mental impairment." 6
' 22See Farmer, 1996 WL 887478 at *5, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998). The
Farmer court, pre-Bragdon, determined that Farmer fell short of the ADA's disability standard

because reproduction failed to qualify as a "major life activity." The "major life activity"
portion of Farmerno longer stands as good law; Bragdon unqualifiedly states that reproduction
constitutes a "major life activity."
'3Deciding under the identical regulatory language as the Bragdon and Farmer courts.
the Northern District of Illinois in Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 916 F.Supp. 797. 801 (N.D. Ill.
1996), held that a woman's unexplained infertility satisfied the "physical impairment" prong of
the ADA's disability test. The court stated, "[it defies common sense to say that infertility is
not a physiological disorder or condition affecting the reproductive system. In fact, infertility is
the ultimate impairment of the reproductive system." While the HCFA's Medicaid policy
regarding Viagra fails to recognize Viagra as a fertility-promoting drug, its decision lacks
judicial authority; further, common definitions of infertility and ED suggest that the two
conditions are quite analogous. Webster defines infertility as not fertile, that is. "[not] capable
of reproducing." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 414, 568 (lst ed, 1995) [hereinafter

WEBSTER'S II]. On the other hand, similar to the NIH's ED definition. Webster defines
impotence as "incapable of sexual intercourse." Id. Alternative reproductive techniques via
non-intercourse methods exist; however, it seems that infertility as a general condition, if not
fully encompassing ED as a specific condition, at least relates closely enough to ED to justify
an analogy
24 between the two disorders.
1 See Conference Statement, supra note 8.
'SSee Criado v. IBM Corporation, 145 F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 1998) (stress relating to

co-workers, depression, and anxiety adequately evidenced that plaintiff was disabled tinder the
ADA); Pritchard v. Southern Co. Service, 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11 th Cir. 1996), amended on
reh'g, 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1996) (major depression constitutes a mental impairment):
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Major Life Activity
The second step of Justice Kennedy's three prong ADA "disability"
test in Bragdon requires a determination of whether the life activity
purportedly limited by a claimant's alleged statutory "'disability"
constitutes a "major life activity."' 127 The Bragdon majority firmly
2
established that reproduction qualifies as a "major life activity*'This section first introduces the points of contention regarding
reproduction as a "major life activity" leading to the Bragdon decision.
as illustrated by a distinctive split of judicial opinion. Subsequently, I
will discuss the Bragdon holding and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent,
which focuses on the contention that "major life activity"
determinations require an individualized inquiry. Finally, this
subsection asks whether sexual intercourse qua sexual intercourse
constitutes a "major life activity." This portion of the article only
examines reproduction and sexual intercourse because I believe these
activities provide the greatest likelihood of establishing a foundation on
which a court may properly determine that ED "substantially limits" a
"major life activity."
Reproduction as a Major Life Activio,
While the ADA fails to define specifically "major life activity."
regulations proffered by the EEOC delineate several qualify ing
activities: "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning. and
working." 30 As the regulatory language "such as" suggests, and as the
Bragdon majority confirms, the EEOC list illustrates without

Coleman v. Keebler Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (post-traumatic strecs disorder,

manifested by tension, anxiety and, depression constitutes a mental impairment under the
ADA). 26
1 While ED regularly comprises a primarily physical condition.
eoadary
psychological factors occasionally contribute to the disorder. Because ED prezumabl% ,atific5

the ADA's disability "impairment" prong under either a "phsical" or "imental:" npairment
analysis, this article need not hypothesize about whether a condition, both ph%Iical and mental
in nature,
27 reaches threshold eligibility under one impairment analysis but not tlhe other

' Bragdon 524 U.S. at 63 1.
':"See idt at 638.

'2 Ihis article leaves others to assess the probability of obtaining "major life atnitt,'"

status for activities such as maintaining a solid marital relationship,
13029 C.F.R § 1630.2(i) (1999).
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exhausting statutorily permissible "major life activities."' 13 1 An
appendix to the EEOC regulations proposes that "sitting, standing,
lifting, and reaching" also constitute "major life activities."13 2 The
EEOC never specifically refers to reproduction as a "major life
activity" in its guidance provisions; 133 consequently, prior to the
Supreme Court's Bragdon decision, courts were split on this issue of
statutory interpretation. Two oft-cited cases, Zatarain v. WDSUTelevision 134 and Pacourek v. Inland Steel,135 exemplify the split in
judicial opinion.
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television
In Zatarainthe plaintiff, Lynn Gansar Zatarain, a reporter and anchorperson with defendant WDSU-Television since 1983, began fertility
treatments in 1992 in an effort to conceive a child. 13 , In early
November 1992, Zatarain informed WDSU that she intended to follow
her physician's recommendation to reduce her work schedule while
undertaking fertility treatments. 137 After Zatarain's contract expired in
late November 1992, WDSU, which offered Zatarain a new contract
prior to her request for reduced hours, 138refused to renew her
employment agreement. 139 Zatarain filed suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that WDSU discriminatorily
discharged her from employment in violation of the ADA.' 4 ' She
argued that her reproductive disorder of an undiagnosed nature
"substantially limited" the "major life activity" of reproduction. The

'31See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39.
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
'"See id.
34
1 Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995).
13See Pacourek,916 F.Supp. at 804.
'"6See Zatarian,881 F. Supp. at 241.
'"See id. at 242.
'3On September 30, 1992, WDSU offered Zatarain a new contract worth $168,000
annually. Zatarain refused this offer, requesting more money and a multi-year guarantee.
WDSU made her a second offer on October 23, 1992 with a higher salary and a two-year
guarantee. The parties disagree on whether Zatarain accepted this offer. See Zatarain, 881 F.
Supp.at 242.
'"See id.
'40See id.
13229
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District Court concluded, however, reproduction failed
to constitute a
"major life activity" under the ADA for two reasons. 14
First, the court asserted: "[T]he structure of the ADA and its
regulations indicate that the major life activity that is limited is separate
and distinct from the impairment that limits it.,' 412 Therefore, the court
maintained "[Zatarain's] argument is faulty because it would allow her
to bootstrap a finding of substantial limitation of a major life activity on
to a finding of an impairment."' 143 To clarify, the court characterized
Zatarain's argument as follows: her claimed statutory "impairment" - a
reproductive disorder - interfered with the alleged "major life activity"
of reproduction, which was purportedly "substantially limited" by her
reproductive disorder.144 Pursuant to this characterization of Zatarain's
argument, the45 court deemed Zatarain's analysis circular and
unpersuasive. 1
Second, the court determined reproduction failed to comport with
the illustrative list of "major life activities" provided in the ADA
regulations. 146 The majority pointed to the fact that unlike reproduction.
a person must "walk, see, learn,
speak, breathe, and work throughout
147
the day, day in and day out."'
Pacourekv. InlandSteel
Holding conversely to Zatarain, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Pacourekdetermined reproduction qualified as an
ADA "major life activity. ' ' 14S In 1991 plaintiff Charline Pacourek. an
employee of Inland Steel, began treatment for an unexplained infertility
problem causing her to miss several days of work.149 Shortly after
receiving an ultimatum not to miss any more work without a
physician's letter and to simply improve her attendance, Inland Steel
1'See id at 243.
' 42
See id. at 242.
14 1Zatarain,881 F. Supp. at 242.
'44See id
14'See id

146See id
14 7See id; see also Kraul v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center. 95 F 3d 674. 77?Uth Cir,

1996) (relying upon the reproductior'major life activity" analysis in Zataramn to hold that
reproduction is not a cognizable "major life activity" under the ADA).
14SPacourek,916 F.Supp. at 804.
49
1 See id. at 799.
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terminated Pacourek's
employment.150 Subsequently, Pacourek filed
51
suit under the ADA.'
The Pacourek court disagreed with the Zatarain majority's
"bootstrapping" analysis.1 52 The Pacourek opinion, however,
sidestepped the merits of the reasoning process underlying Zatarain's
"bootstrapping" determination and concluded:
"[B]ecause the EEOC rulemakers included the reproductive
system among body systems that can suffer from an
impairment under the ADA, they anticipated that a
physiological disorder of the reproductive system may be
covered under the ADA. 5 3 Otherwise, including the
reproductive system in 154
the body systems that can be impaired
would be superfluous."'
Additionally, the Pacourek court disagreed with the Zatarain
majority's dissection of the EEOC's illustrative list of "major life
activities,"
suggesting
Zatarain's quantitative
interpretation
155
unjustifiably narrows the buzz-word.
Citing the appendix to the
EEOC regulations, the majority first dubbed " '[m]ajor life activities'
[as] those basic activities that the average person in the general
population can perform with little or no difficulty,"' 56and subsequently
noted the EEOC's guidance mentions nothing regarding the frequency
with which the basic activities must occur. 5 7 The Pacourek maJority
defined "major life activity" in terms of quality, considering the
infrequent nature of reproduction as failing to relegate its status to a
non-major life activity, thereby dismissing the Zatarian majority's
exegesis.158 According to Judge Alesia's lugubrious suggestion, none
of us would exist without reproduction.'59 Describing childbirth as one
'5 °See id.
S'1See id.
52
See id.
53
1 Pacourek, 916 F.Supp. at 801-02.
54
' See id.
'See id. at 804.
"See id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. at 402 (1998).
' 5 TSee id.

1'SPacourek, 916 F.Supp. at 804.
'"See id.
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of life's most significant moments and greatest achievements, the
Pacourek court held that reproduction, as
an integral part of life.
' 60
activity."'
life
"major
constitutes a statutory
Bragdon's "MajorLife Activity" Analysis

Utilizing an approach remarkably similar to the one employed by the
Pacourek majority, the Supreme Court in Bragdon adopted a
"qualitative" rather than a "quantitative" definition of "major life
activity. ' 16l Justice Kennedy embraced the First Circuit's reasoning in
Abbot v. Bragdon to support this distinction.'1 2 Because the ADA fails
to define "major life activity," the First Circuit construed the term in
accordance with its ordinary meaning, as dictated by the Supreme
Court in Bailey v. United States.'t

3

Looking to familiar dictionary

definitions as taught by Bailey, the First Circuit concluded "the plain
meaning of the word 'major' denotes comparative importance ...
[which] suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an activity's
inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance.... 4
Embracing this definition, the Supreme Court held reproduction "falls
well within the phrase 'major life activity' "and immediately thereafter
stated: "Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are
central to the life process itself."'165 According to Justice Kennedy,
nothing in the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act regulations (comprising a
list identical to the EEOC's ADA regulations) suggests that "major life
activities" must entail a public, economic, or daily dimension.fL" On
the contrary, Justice Kennedy stated, "reproduction could
not be
17
regarded as any less important than working and learning."'

6

"See id

161Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 63S.
' 62See id

16'See Abbot, 912 F. Supp. at 939, citi g Bailey v. United States. 116 S Ct 501. A16

(1995).
"64Abbot, 912 F.Supp. at 939-40, citing THE AMERICAN'r HEPTAGE DI0TAuTrX u' IE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1084 (3d ed. 1992) (listing "greater than others inimportanee or raAn! Lthe initial definition of "major"); WEBSTER'S Nimh NEW COLLEGATE DtcT1Q,4oPY 710 19391
(defining "major" as "greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest")
1"'Bragdon, 524

16'See id.
7

16 See

id.

U.S. at 638.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Bragdon.168 He argued that
in defining the term "major," the majority ignored its alternative
definition, "greater in quantity, number, or extent"'169 - a definition the
Chief Justice viewed as being more consistent with the EEOC's
illustrative list of major life activities. 170 Chief Justice Rehnquist could
not deny that reproductive decisions are important in a person's life,
but stated repetitive performance and essentiality in a normally
functioning individual's day to day existence, not fundamental
importance, constitutes the common thread linking the listed activities
together. 171
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist refuted the argument - relied
upon in Pacourek,and introduced by both Abbot and the United States
as amicus curie - proposing that "major life activity" comprises
reproduction because the ADA regulations define "physical
impairment" to include physiological disorders affecting the
reproductive system.172 To discredit this argument, the Chief Justice
recited disorders of the reproductive system such as dysmenorrhea and
endometriosis - conditions so painful that they limit a woman's ability
13
to engage in major life activities such as walking and working.
Justice Kennedy's definition of "major" obviated a discussion on this
issue. 174 Notably, neither Chief Justice Rehnquist, nor 7the
majority,
5
addressed the Zatarainmajority's bootstrapping analysis.1
Despite the Zatarain explication and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
Bragdon dissent, reproduction qualifies as a "major life activity" under
the ADA post-Bragdon.176 The Chief Justice's dissent in Bragdon,
however, raised a pertinent issue not directly addressed in Justice
Kennedy's opinion: whether a "disability" determination must
comprise an individualized inquiry. 77 The Chief Justice argued "maj or
'6 5See id. at 657.
69
1 See id. at 660
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DIcTIoNARY
702 (10th ed. 1994).
170Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660.
17See id.
"'"See id.
173See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4
'7 5See

id. at 661.

17See generally Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624.
6
" See id. at 638.
'77See id. at 657.
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life activity" decisions require individualization. 17 He cited ADA §
12102(2), which states that a disability determination must be made
"with respect to an individual," and ADA § 12102(2)(A), which
provides that a "disability" includes "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities ofsuch
individual."'179 After attacking the majority for neglecting to
individualize its "major life activity" analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist
proceeded to suggest that no evidence indicated that Abbot's HIV
status precluded her aspirations for reproduction, or that she even
planned to bear children. I s° Justice O'Connor, concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part, agreed with the Chief Justice on this
issue and proffered that Abbot failed to prove "that her ...
HIV status
substantially limited one or more of her major life activities."':'
Justice Kennedy, while not directly enunciating his position in the
Bragdon decision, fully recognized the need for an individualized
inquiry regarding disability and based his opinion on a precise
individualization understanding, though one different than Chief Justice
Rehnquist's construction. IS2 Justice Kennedy individualized the
"substantially limits" analysis, while indicating a court should draw
bright lines when deciding whether the ADA contemplates an activity
as a "major life activity."' 1 3 Therefore, the Court's individualization
technique for disability determinations does not ask whether the "major
life activity" at issue particularly concerns the plaintiff.""4
Not surprisingly, post-Bragdon the Supreme Court in Sutton i.
q ' followed
United Air Lines'8 s and in Albertsons v. KirIkingbzrg
Justice Kennedy's ADA individualization approach. In these cases,
each Court stated: "The determination of whether an individual has a
disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the
17

8See id

179See id.at 657, incorrectly citingq 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)tA) (1994) mstctl (f 42 U S C
§ 12102(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
ISSee Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 659.
SISee id. at 664 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part znd d
iinatinpart)
(emphasis2 added).
ISSee id.at 641.
3
'S
See id at 640-41.
184See Theresa A. Schneider, Stretching the Limits ofthe. IDA.4
.stMtito
Status as a Disability inBragdon v.Abbot. NEB. L. REv. 206, 212 (1993)
iSSSutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

i86Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).

l-Po0teive
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impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment
on the life of the individual."' 7 The Albertsons Court went further
stating, "The determination of whether an individual is substantially

limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case
basis."' 88 In light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on
the issue, this article assumes that regardless of the individual in

question, reproduction under Bragdon constitutes a "major life
activity." 189 Courts only need to conduct individualized inquiries as to

whether a person's impairment "substantially limits" reproduction. 'g
This individualized methodology obviates an inquiry into whether
individuals who cannot reproduce, or choose not to reproduce, satisfy
the 'major life activity' prong of the ADA - they do. Individuals
benefiting from the Bragdon majority's individualization approach
include, but are certainly not limited to: individuals choosing to use

birth control regularly, surgically sterilized individuals and their
partners, homosexual individuals (discounting artificial insemination
via a non-partner), menopausal women and their partners, couples with

HIV desiring not to infect offspring with the virus, and, certainly,
individuals with ED.19

'87Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 and Albertsons, 527 U.S. at 565, both citing 29 C.FR. pt. 1630
App. § 1630.2() (1998).
.SSAlbertsons, 527 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). See also Reeves v. Johnson Controls
World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In deciding whether a particular
activity is a 'major life activity,' we ask whether that activity is a significant one within the
contemplation of the ADA, rather than whether that activity is important to a particular
plaintiff.").
"89See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 640.
190One interesting twist in the individualized inquiry tale arises from Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999), the post-Bragdon
companion case to Sutton. Justice O'Connor states, "Petitioner's impairment does not
substantially limit one or more of his major life activities." Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
Justice O'Connor's position in Murphy, a case decided on the same day as Sutton and
Albertsons, suggesting that courts should address major life activities individually, is not
surprising in light of her partial dissent in Bragdon. Curiously, however, no member of the
Murphy Court dissented to Justice O'Connor's phraseology "his major life activities."
191This list potentially includes individuals already parenting one child and barred from
further reproduction pursuant to a statute similar to China's one-child-per-family policy. See
e.g., June Preston, CNN's Turner calls for one child perfamily, REUTERS, Sept. II,1998.
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Sexual Intercourse as a "MajorLife Activity"
If a court determines that ED fails to "substantially limit" reproduction
- an issue discussed in the next section of this article - an ED victim
could construct a strong argument that sexual intercourse constitutes an

ADA-permissible "major life activity," which ED "substantially
limits." In Bragdon, immediately following the majority's
determination that reproduction falls well within the phrase "major life
activity," Justice Kennedy proffered: "Reproduction and the sexual
dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process."lc 2 Pursuant to

Webster's definition of dynamics - "[t]he physical, intellectual, or
moral forces that produce motion, activity, and change in a given
sphere"'193 - the phrase "sexual dynamics" seems to encompass. at the

bare

minimum,

sexual

intercourse.

W,,hile

Justice

Kennedy's

asseveration reads as dictum, the Bragdon Court interpreted the term

"major" to denote comparative importance and significance. Therefore,

similar to reproduction, another activity central to the life process sexual dynamics - presumably rises to the level of comparative

and consequently constitutes a "major life activity" under
significance,
94

Bragdon.
As noted by the Bragdon majority, the ADA derived much of its
language from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the term
"major life activity."'195 Justice Kennedy remarked, "Congress'
repetition of a vell-established term carries the implication that
Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with preexisting regulatory interpretations."'196 To illustrate "major life
activities" for ADA purposes, Justice Kennedy relied on the
192Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).
'93WEBSTER'S II. supra note 123, at 353.
94

' Would an analysis of intercourse as a major life activity under Jultice Rehuqubt's

dissent in Bragdon depend on how often an individual engaged in intercource ' * Perhaps;
Justice Rehnquist also suggests, however, that not only repetitiveness but a' o e ;nentultt n
the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual link- the LiLOC' e\mple
"major life activities:' While intercourse is generally essential to the eistence of the hunn
race by virtue of the need for human reproduction, clearly the Chief Justice vaa not referring to
such an essentiality; otherwise he would have deemed reproduction a "major life actiity."
Therefore, under Justice Rehnquist's Bragdon dissent. qualifying intercourme a, a mqajor life
activity" might require a judicial determination of whether intercourze qua intercourse is
essential in the day-to-day existence of the individual at issue.
195See Bragdon, 524 U.S at 637-38.
'96See id. at 632.
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Rehabilitation Act regulations. 197 Therefore, the Bragdon majority
opinion indicates that guidance regarding the Rehabilitation Act's term
"major life activity" applies to an interpretation of the identical phrase
as used in the ADA.
In 1988, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ),
empowered with Rehabilitation Act implementation and enforcement
capabilities pursuant to a 1980 order from President Carter, 198 issued a
memorandum regarding the application of the Rehabilitation Act to
HIV-infected individuals. 199 The memorandum asserts that while not
affecting any major life activity illustrated in the regulations - which
are not exhaustive - the DOJ "believe[s] at least some courts would
find a number of other equally important matters to be directly
affected." 200 Further, the memo states, "Perhaps the most important
such activities are procreation and intimate personal relations."20 1 If
intercourse falls within the domain of "intimate personal relations,"
then the DOJ evidently considered intercourse to constitute a "major
life activity" as of 1988. The DOJ memorandum, however, proceeds to
state, "[T]he life activity of engaging in sexual relations is threatened
202
and substantially limited by the contagiousness of the [HIV] virus."
Absence of the word "major" in the DOJ's description of sexual
relations is obvious, yet the memo at least ties "sexual relations" to the
statutory requirement "substantially limited." In sum, while the DOJ's
1988 memorandum lacks lucidity, at a minimum it connotes the
possibility intercourse may qualify as a "major life activity." 2 3 In light
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term "major" in Bragdon
and the DOJ's memorandum, presumably a court would construe
sexual intercourse as a "major life activity" under the ADA.
' 97See id. at 638.

193See Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981).
199The DOJ's power applies to Title II of the ADA, not Title 1, which applies to
employment; however, Justice Kennedy in Bragdon states that the Supreme Court draws
guidance from the views of the agencies authorized to administer other sections of the ADA.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646.
20
Memorandum from United States Justice Department to Arthur B. Culvahouse. Jr.,
Counsel to the President, Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Rehabilitation
Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, 195 DAILY LABOR REP. D-1 (Sep. 27. 1988)

(emphasis
20 1 added).
See id.

20

2See id. (emphasis added).

203

See id.
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Substantial Limitation
The third and final element of Justice Kennedy's ADA "disability" test
in Bragdon compels a judicial determination of whether a claimant's
physical impairment "substantially limits" the "major life activity" at
issue. 20 4 A proper analysis of the statutory term "substantially limits"
necessarily requires an introduction to the weight judicially due to the
EEOC's ADA regulations and guidance provisions - a subject
introduced in this section and discussed in greater detail in the third
section of this article. Second, this section attempts to glean a suitable
and comprehensible definition of "substantially limits" from the
amalgamation of interpretations stemming from the EEOC guidelines
and from judicial pronouncements regarding this buzz-word. Third,
this section will discuss the Supreme Court's holding in Sutton i%
United Air Lines, 20 5 which mandates courts to consider mitigating
measures to an individual's impairment when determining whether that
individual qualifies as "significantly limited" in a "major life activity."
206

Because the Sutton Court's decision entails a question of statutory
interpretation and not one of constitutionality, Congress may - in light
of overwhelming disagreement with the Sutton majority's position by
the Sutton dissent, by eight of ten courts of appeal, and by all three
executive agencies interpreting the ADA - amend the ADA to trump
the Sutton majority's conclusion. Therefore, the final segment of this
section will analyze an ED sufferer's chances to qualify, as
"substantially limited" in the "major life activity" of reproduction
(and/or sexual intercourse) under Sutton as it currently stands and under
a rule resulting from a congressional reversal of Sutton.
Introduction to the ProperWeight JudiciallyDue
to EEOC Regulations and Interpretive Guidance
Three Government agencies share the authority to promulgate ADA
regulations. The EEOC may issue regulations to carry out the
employment provisions of Title 1.207 The DOJ possesses the power to
204

See Bragdon, 524 U.S at 630.
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 474.
20
2 7 See it at 475.
° See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
20
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publish rules relating to public services under Title 1I.208 The
Department of Transportation (DOT) maintains authority to issue
regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of Titles II and
111.209

Each of these agencies may proffer technical assistance, such as
interpretive guidelines, to aid in the implementation and enforcement of
their respective provisions.2 10 No agency, however, retains the
authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable
provisions of the ADA, which fall outside of Titles I-IV. 2t l Most
notably, the ADA delegates no agency the responsibility to interpret the
term "disability," which comprises the terms "impairment," "major life
activity," and "substantial limitation." 212 The EEOC, nonetheless,
issued regulations and interpretive guidance to provide additional
213
direction regarding the proper interpretation of these vague terms.
The third section of this exposition will fully discuss the proper weight
that a court must grant these agency pronouncements. For now, it will
suffice to recognize that courts have granted great weight to the EEOC
regulations and appendix to those regulations,214while the EEOC's
interpretive guidance pertaining to "substantial limitations"
garners a
2 5
questionable, and indeed debated, degree of deference. 1
The EEOC's regulations regarding the ADA language
"substantially limits" define the term as:
(i)

Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or

(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or

2 3

s5ee 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149(a), 12164, 12186(a)(1), 12143(b) (1994).
2 10
See 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(1) (1994).
2 11
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102 (1994).
2
'2See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
213
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (1998).
2 14
See, e.g., Kraul, 95 F.3d at 677; Pacourek, 916 F.Supp. at 803; Bragdon. 524 U.S at
657 (relying on HEW Rehabilitation Act regulations identical to the EEOC ADA regulations).
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478 (both parties accept the EEOC regulations regarding the term
"disability").
21
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
2 09
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duration under which an individual can perform a major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the 1general population
can perform that same major life activity. b
The EEOC regulations further recommend consideration of the
following factors to determine whether an individual is "substantially
limited" in a "major life activity":
(i)

The nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment;
and
(iii) The permanent or long-term impact, or expected
permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.217
Finally, the EEOC's inteipretive guidance regarding "substantial
limitations," provides that "[t]he determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made
on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."2 1 ;
The litigants in Sutton, a 1999 Supreme Court case discussed in
the "mitigation" subsection below, accepted the EEOC's regulations
pertaining to the ADA's "substantial limitation" language, but disputed
the persuasive force of the interpretive guidelines. 2 19 After determining
that the outcome of the case failed to hinge on a ruling regarding the
weight, if any, that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines hold, the Sutton
majority declined to decide the proper degree of deference due to those
C.F.R. § 1630.2i) (1998).
See id.
27S2 9 C.F.R. pt. 1630. App § 1630.2Cj) (199S)

21629
217

The DOJ proffers a smidar guidAlhne

"The question of whether a person with a disability should be assesed v.
ithout re!ard to the

availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or au\Iliar* aids and
services." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A § 35.104 (1998); 23 C.F.R, pt. 36, App, B, § 36.104
(1998). Justice Stevens, dissenting in Sutton, suggested that the DOT also assesce disabilities

without219regard to mitigating measures. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-96 (Ste%ens. .,dis:enting).
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 4:73

guidelines. 220 Therefore, the question regarding the proper weight
commanded by the EEOC's assistance in interpreting the ADA term
"substantially limits" remains open. Several United States circuit courts
of appeal post-Sutton diligently follow the EEOC's regulations in
conducting "substantial limitation" analyses under the ADA. 22 1 While
declining to address the force of the EEOC's interpretive guidelines,
the Sutton Court held contrary to the guidelines' substantive position
regarding the term "substantially limits." 222 Consequently, lower
courts post-Sutton decline to follow this aspect of the guidelines.
Defining "Substantially Limits"
Deferring a thorough examination of the issue tackled by the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines - the "mitigation" question - to the next
subsection, this segment attempts to fasten loosely together definitions
of the term "substantially limit" that courts may utilize in conducting
ADA disability determinations. As noted above, several United States
courts of appeal followed the EEOC regulations' "substantial
limitation" definition, focusing on whether an impaired individual is
unable, or is significantly restricted from, performing a "major life
activity" that the average person in the general population can
perform. 223 In addition to this interpretation, the Supreme Court in
both Bragdon and Sutton, and the Second Circuit in Colwell v. Szffolk
County Police Department, 224simultaneously sharpened and confilsed
the search for a coherent definition of this highly contested ADA term.
The Supreme Court majority in Bragdon determined Abbot's
asymptotic HIV infection "substantially limited" her ability to
reproduce in two regards: (1) A woman infected with HIV who tries to
conceive a child imposes on her male partner a significant risk of

220

See id. at 462.
See, e.g., Fjellstad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 1999 WL 642958, at *2 (8th Cir.);
Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, 1999 WL 649376, at *7 (3d Cir.); Hilburn v. Murata
Electronics North America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11th Cir. 1999); McClure v. West,
1999 WL 436104, at *3-4 (4th Cir.).
unpublished,
2 22
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 462.
223
See supra note 22 1.
224
See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 635.
221
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becoming infected; 225and (2) A woman risks infecting her child with
IffV during gestation and childbirth.226 After discussing the applicable
percentages of risk, Justice Kennedy stated: "The Act addresses
227

substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities."

While Kennedy recognized the physical possibility of conception and

childbirth for an IV victim, he determined that because these
activities endanger the public health, Abbot's impairment "substantially
limited" the "major life activity" of reproduction. 228

Additionally,

Kennedy opined that conception and childbirth by HIV victims
required expending additional costs for antiretroviral therapy,
supplemental insurance, and long-term health care for the child, and

also violates the laws of certain states, which forbid HIV-infected

2 9
individuals from participating in intercourse. -

The Supreme Court in Sutton only briefly discussed the term

"substantial."2 30 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor simply
referenced the dictionary definition of the word "substantial" in
suggesting, without holding,231"substantial" implies "considerable" or
"specified to a large degree."

In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the
EEOC regulations implementing the ADA term "substantially limits"
in deciding Colwell.232 The court, however, determined that "get[ting]
225Justice Kennedy indicated that 20% of male partners of t, omcn vith HIVl become
HIV-positive themselves. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40, ctingq Omond & Padian, -£-!ia
Transmissionof HIV, AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE, 1.9-S. and tbl, 2 (1994)
'2Bragdon conceded that women infected with HIV fhce appro, imately a 25% rr , of
transmitting the virus to their children. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-40.
227See id.(emphasis added).
22
'SSee idt
229Chief Justice Rehnquist. while dissenting in Bragdon. agreed t~ith the malont" that
the ADA addresses "substantial limitations" on "major life acti ities:" not utter ,nabihtlc
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, maintained that an asymptotic HIV in ection : ubtantitally
limits" reproduction. He argued that such individuals still may engage in ,e\uzll Intercour -e
give birth to a child, and perform the manual tasks necessary to rear a child to maturit%, &e
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2"See id. at 647.
231Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491, citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEV., ITERIUNATIONAL DICMONARY
2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and ".;ubstantial" as
"considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the
main"); 17 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTioNARY 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial': -[rlelating to or
proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity
or dimensions").
2'2See Coh-ell, 158 F. 3d at 641.
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a tough night's sleep" due to a back injury failed to "substantially
limit" the "major life activity" of sleeping because "difficulty sleeping
is extremely widespread., 233 Further, the court stated: "Colwell failed
to show his affliction was any worse than similar afflictions suffered by
a large portion of the nation's adult population." 234 Therefore, the
Colwell court seemed to place a quantitative limit on the EEOC's
"substantial limitation" definition.
In sum, because the Supreme Court in neither Bragdon nor Sutton
comprehensively and authoritatively defined "substantial limitation,"
the term's functional meaning lacks precise boundaries. Based on the
judicial and administrative language available, I suggest viewing the
term "substantial limitation" on a spectrum. At one end of the scale
under Justice Kennedy's Bragdon opinion, "utter inabilities" fail to
comprise "substantial limitations."235 At the other end pursuant to the
Second Circuit's decision in Colwell, "extremely widespread"
difficulties flunk the "substantial limitation" test.2 36 Lying in between
these extremities rest possible "substantial limitation" descriptors such
as "significantly restricted from [performing major life activities]" and
"considerable [limitation] or [a limitation] specified to a large degree"
and the hazy relationship of an individual's limitation to "the average
person in the population." Where these interpretive phrases lie on the
spectrum lacks clarity, as does the point on the scale where a statutory
limitation begins (or ceases) to "substantially limit" a "major life
activity."
MitigatingMeasures
The dominant question arising in the Supreme Court's 1999 Sutton
decision is potentially fatal to an ED sufferer's quest for disability
discrimination recovery -- Must a court acknowledge mitigating
measures (including medication such as Viagra) in the "substantial
limitation" analysis of an ADA "disability" claim? Writing for the
Sutton majority, Justice O'Connor answers this question in the
affirmative. 237 After introducing the Sutton case and delineating Justice
O'Connor's position, this subsection concludes by illustrating the
3

See id.at 644.
id.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 661.
6
2 See Coivell, 158 F.3d at 644.
2 37
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
2

4
23
235See

2000]

MUST EMPLOYERS PAYFOR VI.4GR4?

weaknesses in her reasoning in an effort to outline the basis of a
congressional amendment to trump the Supreme Court's Sutton
decision.
Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines

In 1992 the petitioners in Sutton, twin sisters, each severely myopic,
applied for employment as commercial airline pilots with the
respondent United Air Lines (United). 238 Without corrective lenses

each petitioner's vision tested poorer than 20/100 in each eye; however.
with corrective measures such as glasses or contact lenses, both sisters'

vision measured 20/20 or better - a rating comparable to unimpaired
individuals. 3 9 Because the sisters' eyesight in an unmitigated state
failed to meet United's minimum vision requirement - uncorrected

visual acuity of 20/100 or better - United declined to offer either
petitioner a pilot position. The sisters filed suit under the ADA
alleging that their severe myopia constituted an "impairment" that
"substantially limited" the "major life activity" of seeing.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado

dismissed the sisters' complaint on a motion for summary judgment,
concluding

their correctable

visual

impairments

rendered

the

"substantial limitation" prong of the ADA's disability test
unfulfilled.240 Employing similar logic, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 241 The Tenth Circuit's decision

comprised the minority opinion on this issue at the time it was decided:
eight of the other nine circuit courts of appeal addressing the
243
question 242 and all three executive agencies interpreting the ADA
238

See id

9
2'
240See

id
See Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc., 1996 WL 58917 (DC. CO Aug 2t1.19))
See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (1" Cir. 1993),
242
See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners. 156 F-3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 15th Cir. l%)J.;
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-630 (7th Cir. 1993); Arnold . United Parcel
Service, 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.
136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624. 627 11h Cir 1997);
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (1ith Cir. 1996). Holilian % Lucky
Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). Justice Stevens, dissenting in Statn, SNate. that
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766-68 (6th Cir. 1997) could be recd t- c\prc,;;gn
doubt about the Sutton majority's ruling. See Sutton, 527 US. at 496 (Ste%ens. J discentine!
241
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construed the ADA's "disability" language as disregarding ameliorative
measures.
The Supreme Court in Sutton concluded the appellate courts and
executive agencies that evaluated persons in their uncorrected state
impermissibly interpreted the ADA.244 Rather, Justice O'Connor's
opinion mandated courts to take account of both the positive and
negative effects of measures to correct or mitigate a "physical or mental
impairment" when judging whether such impairment "substantially
limits" a "major life activity." 245 Three provisions of the ADA led the
Court to this decision.
First, the ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities ... ,246 Because the controlling phrase appears in the present
indicative verb form, the Court read the statutory language as
"requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically
27
- substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.,
According to Justice O'Connor, an ADA "impaired" individual
utilizing mitigating measures still qualifies as statutorily "impaired,"
"impairment" fails to "substantially limit" a "major life
but a corrected
248
activity.,
The second ADA provision relied on by the Sutton majority
comports with Justice Kennedy's holding in Bragdon: courts must
249
evaluate "substantial limitations" on an individualized basis.
Consequently, the Sutton Court asserted that judging an individual's
disabled status in his or her uncorrected or unmitigated state requires
speculation about the individual's condition by courts and employers.
Justice O'Connor claimed such speculations will lead to undesirable
disability determinations based on "general information about how an
affects individuals, rather than on the
uncorrected impairment usually
250
condition."
actual
individual's
243

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. § 25.104
(1998);24449 C.F.R. pt. 37.3 (1998).
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500.
245
See id.
24642 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). (emphasis added).
247
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-82.
24 3
See id at 481.
249
See id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
25
°See id. at 483.
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Finally - and critically - based on findings enacted as part of the
ADA, the Sutton majority concluded Congress designed the term
"disability" without correctable conditions in mind.2 5 ' Congress found
that some 43 million Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities. 252 While the Court acknowledges its lack of an exact
source for the 43 million figure, the majority pointed to the ADA's
1988 precursor, which drew a corresponding figure directly from a
1986 report prepared by the National Council on Disability.2 3 This
critical report recognized the difficulty of estimating a precise and
reliable overall figure due to differing operational definitions of the
term "disability."'2 4 The most commonly-quoted estimates of the 1986
report aproximated the number of disabled Americans at 35 to 36
million.2 55 The report, however, estimated ranges from 22.7 million
under a "work disability" definition, which focuses on individuals'
reported ability to work,25 6to 160 million pursuant to a "health
condition" definition, which includes all conditions impairing the
health or normal functional abilities of an individual.25 ' The Sutton
Court determined that the 36 million figure included in the 1988 bill's
findings reflected an approach to defining disabilities closer to the
"work disability" approach than to the "health condition" approach. 2 5
Two years after issuing its 1986 report, the National Council on
Disability issued an updated report' 9 settling on a more concrete
definition of disability. 26 According to the 1988 report, 37.3 million
Americans have "difficulty performing one or more basic physical
activities" including "seeing (even with the aid of glasses or contact
lenses), hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs, lifting or carrying,
getting around outside, and getting into or out of bed."' '6 1 Justice
2"See id. at 493.
' 2-See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994).
3
25 See National Council on Disability, Toward Independence (Februar% 1911).
"vallt.zba
at http:/Avw.ncd.gov/newsroompublicationsitoward.html.

' See id. at 10.
255

ee id
-SSee id. at 10-l l.
2'7See id.
2
-sSutton, 527 U.S. at 485.
2g9See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, On the Threshold of Independence (January
1988), available at http:llvv.ncd.gov/newsroompublicationsfthr.shold html.
26
id
26°See
t
2

See id.
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O'Connor reconciled the difference between the ADA's 43 million
figure and the 1988 report's 37.3 million figure by speculating that in
drafting the ADA Congress included individuals explicitly excluded in
the National Council's report. 262 The most notable groups included
individuals who are under the age of fifteen and those in mental
institutions.263
Following its extensive study to confirm that 43 million
individuals were "disabled" at the time of the ADA's enactment, the
Sutton majority cited a finding that more than 100 million Americans
need corrective lenses (or glasses) to see properly. 264 Therefore, the
Court concluded that individuals with correctable vision impairments
and largely correctable impairments fail to constitute a portion of the 43
million Americans that the ADA sought to help.265
Shortcomings of the Sutton Majority'sRationale
Each of Justice O'Connor's bases for decision rests on arguably
tenuous grounds. After outlining the apparent shortcomings in each of
the Sutton majority's three determinative premises, I will pose a
hypothetical situation to illustrate the perverseness of the Supreme
Court's rule.
In Justice O'Connor's determination, because the statutory phrase
"substantially limits" appears in the present indicative verb form, the
ADA requires courts and employers to analyze individuals in their
262

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485.
While not wholly certain of the source of the ADA's 43 million figure. the Court
grounds the approximate accuracy of the number by citing a surveys performed by the
263

Mathematica Policy Research Inc. This group estimated that 31.4 million civilian noninstitutionalized Americans possessed "chronic activity limitation status" in 1979 and 32.7 such
individuals existed in 1985. In both reports, individuals with "activity limitations" comprised
people who could not conduct "usual" activities, e.g., attending pre-school, keeping house, or
living independently. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS. U.S, DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, Vital Health Statistics, Current Estimates from the National lH'alth

Interview Survey, 1989, Series 10, at 7-8 (1990).
2

'6See NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
SERVICES,
265 Vision Research - A NationalPlan:1999-2003, at 7 (1998).

I1UMAN

The majority notes that use of a corrective device or medicine does not, by itself,
relieve one's disability; individuals taking corrective measures to lessen the symptoms of an
impairment so that they can function may nevertheless remain substantially limited. For
example, individuals who use prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs, while mobile and capable of
functioning in society, may still be disabled because of a substantial limitation on their ability
to walk or run. See Sutton, 527 U. S. at 487.
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present state when drawing "disability" conclusions.2 Dissenting in
Sutton, Justice Stevens suggested if a disability only exists where a
person's present condition is actually impaired, "there would be no
reason to include in the protected class those who were once disabled
but who are now fully recovered as in subsection (B) of the disability
definition. ' 267 Because subsection (B) of the ADA disability definition
clearly covers individuals not presently disabled, the Sutton majority's
grammatical basis for its holding seems insubstantial.
The Sutton majority's second foundational rung hinged on a desire
to eliminate speculation about an individual's unmitigated condition.
Justice Stevens countered this argument by suggesting that viewing a
person in his or her unmitigated state simply requires examining that
individual's abilities in a different state.2 '3 He proffered: "[Ilt is just as
easy individually to test [a person's] eyesight with their glasses on as
with their glasses off., 269 One might argue that Justice Stevens' point
ignores situations where an unmitigated "check-up" poses serious
health risks; take, for example, shutting off a respirator to determine the
unmitigated status of an individual with collapsed lungs. This argument
generally fails, however, because a condition so serious as to
necessitate ongoing respiration or similar treatment will presumably
even in its mitigated state substantially2 70limit some "major life activity,"
for example, the ability to walk or lift.
Finally, the Sutton majority made its decision pursuant to the
finding codified in the ADA that 43 million disabled individuals inhabit
the United States. 27 1 Justice Stevens suggested that despite the 43
million figure the Act's legislative background promotes granting a
generous, rather than a miserly, ADA construction.2 7 2 The Sutton
dissent cited the Committee reports on the bill preceding the ADA,
which clearly indicate that Congress intended the ADA to cover
individuals who require ameliorative measures to perform "-major life
26

'Sutton, 527

267

U.S. at 4S1.

See id. at 499 (Stevens J., dissenting).

26SSee id. at 509 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
269

See id.

270

"[O]ne has a disability ... if, notwithstanding the use of a correltte deice. that
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity." Sutton. 527 U-S at 41= (emphawis
added).27 1
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
272
See id. at 493-94.
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activities.' 273 Indeed, the Senate report directly antecedent to the ADA
states, "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures...." 274 The House of
Representatives' reviewing committees slightly modified the Senate's
proposal and clarified the disability definition as covering "correctable"
or "controllable" disabilities. The Report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary states, "The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures.. .would result in a less-thansubstantial limitation. ' 275 The report continues, proffering this test
covers, for example, a person stricken with poor hearing, "even if the
hearing loss is corrected by the use of a hearing aid., 276 The Report of
the House Committee on Education and Labor likewise determined that
disability analyses should disregard the aid of mitigating measures: for
example, "persons with impairments such as epilepsy or diabetes,
which substantially limit a major life activity are covered ...
even if the
277
medication."
by
controlled
are
effects of the impairment
Consequently, the ADA's precursor Senate and House reports indicate
that Justice O'Connor's third basis for decision, even if statistically
grounded, fails to comport with the legislative history undergirding the
ADA.
Each of the Sutton majority's bases for decision lacks
overwhelming vigor. Further, the resulting outcome - that courts and
employers must acknowledge mitigating and corrective measures when
conducting disability determinations - undesirably skews fundamental
fairness ideals. As suggested by Justice Stevens, "if United regards
petitioners as unqualified because they cannot see well without glasses,
it seems eminently fair for a court also to use uncorrected
vision as the
278
basis for evaluating petitioners' life activity of seeing."
The following hypothetical scenario further illustrates the perverse
result stemming from the Sutton majority's ADA construction.
Steve
and Art are brothers from Michigan. Their local fire station employs
both dedicated young men as firemen. Each passed a hearing test prior
273

See id. at 498.
No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1990).
276
274S.
REP.
27

See id. at 29.

277

H.R. REP. No. 10 1-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990).
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

278
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to employment at the station. One night, in the course of the brothers'
duty, a gas stove explodes from the heat of a surrounding fire and
severely impairs the brothers' hearing.
Several days after the
explosion, Steve worries that his reduced hearing capacity will
diminish his ability to hear trapped victims and purchases a hearing aid
that fully restores his hearing.27 9 Art has a large family and cannot
afford a hearing-restoration device. A few weeks later, the fire
department re-tests the hearing of both men; Steve is tested without his
hearing aid. Both men fail to reach the standard set by the department
for adequate hearing in an unaided state, even though Steve would have
passed the test had he used his hearing aid. Subsequently, the fire
department terminates the employment of both men. Each files a suit
under the ADA claiming disability discrimination. Under the Sutton
majority's decision, Art qualifies as a disabled individual under the
ADA because his "physical impairment" "substantially limits" the
"major life activity" of hearing. 80 Steve, however, may not file suit
pursuant to the ADA; he corrected his impairment and therefore fails to
qualify as statutorily "disabled" post-Sutton. Steve attempted to better
qualify himself to perform an essential function of his vocation; upon
termination, Sutton restricts him from filing suit under the ADA. Had
Steve, like Art, not taken remedial measures, Sutton would allow him
to file suit under the ADA. Such a result is mystifying.
The Supreme Court decided Sutton strictly on a statutory
interpretation of the ADA; constitutional considerations ground no
portion of the opinion. Therefore, Congress possesses the authority to

amend the ADA in a fashion that supersedes the Sutton decision.2 'l In
light of the tenuous grounds relied upon by the majority and the
inequitable consequences of the holding's result, Congress, which prior
2

_'>This hypothetical situation assumes that the fire station pros ides neithier Stw%e nor Art

with disability insurance.
2,0To recover against his employer under the ADA. Art w'ould hae to proe that he can
perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodations and
prove that the fire station impermissibly discriminated against him based upon his di_ ability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Additionally, Art's employer could avoid liability if the

employer shows that the hearing-level criteria is job-related and consistent v.ith business
necessity or shows that hearing at a level poorer than its standard po:es a hialth or cafety
hazard. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113 (a) and (b), respectively, (1994). This c\amploeslmply ,spires
to indicate Sutton's impact on qualification as "disabled" under the ADA.
2'U.S. CONST. Art I.
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to the ADA's enactment recommended disregarding mitigating
measures in a disability analysis, may explicitly amend the ADA to
mandate such action.
PuttingIt All Together
Assume for the moment that a court concludes that ED qualifies as a
statutory "impairment." To recover for disability discrimination under
the ADA, an ED-stricken individual must prove that his ED
"substantially limits" reproduction, or alternatively, "substantially
limits" intercourse if a court deems such activity a "major life
activity. '282 I will first discuss the factors that a court making this
"disability" determination will likely view as important under the
Sutton decision as it currently stands. Subsequently, I present a similar
analysis under an assumption, arguendo, that a congressional
amendment to the ADA supersedes Sutton and forces courts to
disregard mitigating measures when conducting
disability
determinations.
UnderSutton
Post-Sutton, of men successfully responding to Viagra, 3 most will fail
the "substantial limitation" prong of the ADA's "disability" test.
Economic impact of Viagra purchases or negative side effects caused
by the wonder-drug, however, may4 "substantially limit" some ED
sufferers despite the Sutton holding.
In Bragdon, the majority determined although an HIV victim
possesses the physical capacity to conceive and bear a child, the
dangerous implications of such a birth to the public health
"substantially limit" reproduction.2 8 5 After pronouncing this
conclusion, the Court immediately stated the decision of an HIVpositive individual to reproduce also carries economic consequences
such as added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance,

82
283See

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 626.
For examples of the percentage of men successfully responding to Viagra, see Pizcr's

clinical study
results. See PINK SHEET, supra note 20.
284See Diane Levick, supra note 33.
285
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-42.
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and long-term health care for the child.28 6 Tis dictum suggests the
cost of drugs such as Viagra used to mitigate an impairment like ED
potentially "substantially limits" the "major life activity" of
reproduction (or intercourse if judicially deemed a "major life
activity"). To decide a claim proffered solely under this line of Justice
Kennedy's Bragdon dictum, a court presumably must answer three
questions: (1) How much weight does Justice Kennedy's statement
hold?; (2) Can cost alone "substantially limit" a "major life activity"?;
and (3) If the answer to question (2) is yes, how great a cost constitutes
a "substantial limitation"? Of course, the answer to question (3)
necessarily depends on an individual's financial situation since the
BragdonSuttonrAlbertsons ADA disability approach mandates an
individualized inquiry into the "substantial limitation" question. The
notion that one's disability status hinges on the amount of money an
individual possesses will disappear if Congress supplants the Sitton
ruling via an ADA amendment.
Alternatively, in light of the Sutton majority's ruling that
"disability" assessors acknowledge both positive and negative effects
of mitigating measures, adverse effects of Viagra consumption may
lead to a finding that ED "substantially limits" certain individuals from
the "major life activity" of reproduction (or intercourse if judicially
deemed a "major life activity"). Men consuming Viagra risk suffering
from any of the wonder-drug's documented adverse side effects.
Serious heart problems have garnered the media spotlight, and for good
reason: heart-related deaths accounted for seventy-seven of the 130
Viagra-related deaths in the United States reported to the FDA prior to
December of 1998.287 Additionally, Viagra may induce non-fatal but
serious heart conditions such as monomorphic ventricular tachycardia,
a condition identifiable by a heartbeat so increased that it rises to
dangerous levels. 2S8 Besides heart problems, Pfizer lists in its package
2 6

lustice Kennedy also states that the decision to reproduce carries legal con--ciuncel.

For example, the laws of some states forbid persons with HIV from having seual intercourse
with others, regardless of consent. See Bragdon,524 U.S. at 639-40.
7
2s See Viagra User Suesfor Heart Problems, 17 No. 9 PROD. LiAt. L & Simw,-Gy I
(March 1999).
2SSMost, but not all, patients reporting heart difficulties had pre- \isting crdtovax- ular
risk factors. See Package Insert, supra note 21. Pfizer's product label, updated on NO%emler
24, 1998, indicates that Viagra can cause transient decreases in blood pre&.ure in patients ratth

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 4:73

insert several adverse effects recognized in its clinical trials. Pfizer
breaks the side effects into three categories:
(1) Adverse effects reported by greater than 2% of patients
treated with Viagra, but more frequently reported by
individuals on the drug than on a placebo: headache,
flushing, dyspepsia, nasal congestion, urinary tract
infection, abnormal vision (transient in all but one of
734 subjects tested), diarrhea, dizziness, rash.
(2) Adverse reactions occurring in greater than 2% of
patients treated with Viagra, but equally common on
the drug or a placebo: respiratory tract infection, back
pain, flu syndrome, and arthralgia.
(3) Events occurring in less than 2% of patients treated
with Viagra, but for which any causal relationship to
Viagra remains uncertain: shock, allergic reaction,
chest pain, tachycardia, hypotension, cardiac arrest,
heart failure, colitis, gastroenteritis, esophagitis,
abnormal liver function tests, rectal hemorrhage,
anemia, gout, hyperglycemia, arthritis, vertigo,
depression, laryngitis, herpes simplex, deafness, eye
289
hemorrhage, and urinary incontinence.
Further, after marketing Viagra, Pfizer observed physical effects
associated with the drug, including myocardial infarction, sudden
cardiac death, ventricular arrhythmia, cerebrovascular hemorrhage,
transient ischemic attack and hypertension, seizure, priapism, ocular
blurring, ocular swelling/pressure, and retinal vascular disease or
bleeding. Pursuant to the Bragdon/Sutton/Albertsons decision to
perform "substantial limitation" analyses on an individualized basis,
most ED sufferers able to prove that Viagra causally adversely affected

heart disease. See Pfizer Updates Viagra Warning, 14 No. 7 ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL
LITIG. REP. 15 (December 1998).
289
See Package Insert, supra note 21.
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them may plausibly argue that negative effects related to the ingestion
of this ED mitigating drug "substantially limit" a "major life activity."
Negative side effects caused by Viagra intake generally will not
afflict reproduction or intercourse but other "major life activities." In
Sutton, however, Justice O'Connor never suggested that negative side
effects caused by a mitigating measure must adversely affect the major
life activity for which an individual takes the measure. 2 0 Therefore,
hypothetically, an ED victim inflicted with retinal vascular disease due
to Viagra ingestion could argue his physical2 impairment, ED,
substantially limits the major life activity of seeing. 9
Arguendo: A CongressionalAmendinent to the ADA
Supersedes Sutton
If, arguendo, a congressional amendment to the ADA supplants the
Sutton ruling, an ED-stricken individual maintains an excellent
probability of qualifying as statutorily "disabled." Regardless of the
precise language relied upon to interpret "substantial limitation," it
seems quite clear that without Viagra or a similar drug ED
"substantially limits" reproduction. 292 Some might argue unmitigated
ED fails to eliminate reproduction for some ED sufferers due to the
availability of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) such as
intrauterine insemination. According to the Bragdon majority,
I
however, the ADA addresses "substantial limitations, not inabilities"
Court suggested that "substantial" implies
and the Sutton
"considerable. ' 294 Further, in the language of the EEOC regulations,
2 0

9 Examples cited in Sutton bolster the veracity of this observation. Se Stiton. 527 U S,

at 484, citing Johnson, Antips'chotics: Pros and Cons of .lntipsv.ehotls. RN (Aug, 19J7)
(antipsychotic drugs can cause painful seizures), Liver RtsL , arntng ,JdLd to P4trL sUn s
Drug, FDA CONSUMER (Mar. 1,1999) (drug for treating Parkinson's di'a&e can cauZ her
damage).
291
At first blush it seems plausible that if neither Viagra cost or Viagra-widucd neative
side effects alone "substantially limits" a "major life activity," the combinatton of co-t and
er. each of
adverse effect could statutorily qualify an individual as "disabled," UnLes. hou,
these two consequences of Viagra ingestion affects the same major life acti ity,and the

compounded effects "substantially limited" that major life activity, a disability finding post
Sutton292
appears unlikely.
This article leaves discussion pertaining to individuals possessing "partial" ED for
another day.
293
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
2
See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
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"substantial limitations" "significantly restrict... [the] manner...under
which an individual can perform a major life activity as compared to
the... manner.. .under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity."2 95 In light of the
physical and mental trauma, time spent, and the substantial cost of
reproduction via medical techniques, it seems likely under my proposed
congressional amendment that courts would find ED "substantially
limits" reproduction for many ED sufferers,
regardless of which
"substantial limitation" definition they use.2 96
In light of available ARTs, a court could determine that ED fails to
"substantially limit" reproduction, but still deem sexual intercourse a
"major life activity." In this situation, without Viagra or a similar drug,
ED undeniably "substantially limits" sexual intercourse.
Congress could amend the ADA to only partially supersede
Sutton; that is, Congress could state that courts must acknowledge
mitigating or corrective measures only for trivial "impairments" when
performing "disability" determinations. Justice Stevens' dissent in
Sutton suggests that even if the Court disregarded mitigating measures
as a general rule, "it would still be necessary to decide whether that
general rule should be applied to what might be characterized as a
minor, trivial impairment." 297 Justice Stevens cited the First Circuit's
decision in Arnold v. United ParcelService, which held an unmitigated
state determinative, but he suggested that the Court might reach a
different result in a case where "a simple inexpensive remedy" such as
eyeglasses exists and "can provide total and relatively permanent
control of all symptoms."2 98 Under this proffered limited amendment it
seems unclear whether Viagra falls within the "general rule" or not.
Depending on the quantity ingested, several years' supply of Viagra
29529 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j) (1998).
296
One possible note of trouble for ED-stricken individuals in the context or a
congressional amendment supplanting the Sutton decision, however, arises from Colwell v.
Suffolk County. See Colwell v. Suffolk County, 153 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998). In Colwell.
the Second Circuit, determined that a "tough night's sleep," thils to "substantially limit" the
major life activity of sleeping because "difficulty sleeping is extremely widespread,"
Depending on the proper weight garnered by the Second Circuit's pre-Sutton opinion and on
further judicial interpretation of "widespread," ED - afflicting an estimated ten to thirty million
Americans - may or may not constitute a "widespread" hardship. See id.
297

Sutton, 527 U.S at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

298

Arnold v. United Parcel Service, 136 F.3d 854, 866 n. 10 (i" Cir. 1998), cited in
Sutton, 497 U.S. at 496.
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likely costs more than a pair of eyeglasses. Further, the phrase "total
and permanent control" with regard to ED solicits debate.
APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO HEALTH INSURANCE
This section discusses whether an employer invokes ADA
discrimination liability by refusing to self-cover Viagra or to purchase
sufficient optional Viagra coverage for an employee suffering from ED.
The entirety of this section assumes, arguendo, the ED-stricken
individual in question qualifies as "disabled" under the ADA.21 As
stated above, the ADA prohibits discrimination in employer-provided
health benefit plans, offered either via self-insurance or by way of
insurance company, HMO, or any other similar entity. 30 Upon an
allegation that an employer-provided health insurance plan violates the
ADA, the EEOC, charged with enforcement of the ADA, must first
determine whether the claimant qualifies as statutorily "disabled," and
then whether the challenged plan constitutes a disability-based
distinction.3"' Even if disability grounds undergird a plan's distinction.
however, a statutory escape hatch - § 501(c) of the ADA, better Imown
as "the safe harbor provision" - may rescue an employer from
liability. 30 2 Congress included the safe harbor provision in the ADA to
assuage insurers concerned that the elimination of disability-based
discrimination would undermine traditional risk assessment techniques
via applicant distinction determinations. 30 3 The portion of § 501(c)
salient to employer-provided insurance plans states:
[Titles I through IV] of this Act shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict:
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or
29

9This analysis applies to claims against employers \,ho either refue to pay for an
employee's Viagra prescription or allegedly do not provide "enough" Viagruo This article

leaves the question of how much Viagra is "enough" for another day.
3
303.See 42 U.S.C. § 1220 1(c) (1994).
See Interim Guidance, supra note 80.
302
See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1994).
303
See id.
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administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that are based on underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan
that is not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance.
Paragraphs (2), (3) shall not be used as a subterfige to
evade the purposes of [Titles] I and III of this [Act]."'
Section 501(c)(2) relates to employer-provided insurance plans
under contract with an insurance company, HMO, or the like, otherwise
known as "traditional insurance. ' '30s
Section 501(c)(3) concerns
employer-provided self-insurance plans where employers generally
expend insurance costs from their own holdings. To secure protection
from the safe harbor provision and thus constitute a permissible health
insurance plan under the ADA, § 501(c)(2) requires an employer's
traditional insurance plan that maintains a disability-based distinction
to qualify as: (1) "bona fide"; (2) not inconsistent with state law; and
(3) "non-subterfuge." 3°6 Under § 501(c)(3), an employer providing a
self-insurance plan with a disability-based distinction need only offer
its employees a benefit plan that is (1) "bona-fide" and (2) not used as
"subterfuge" to constitute an ADA permissible health insurance plan.30 7
3

°4See id. Paragraph (1) of ADA §501(c), not cited in the text of this article, relates to
underwriting, classifying, and administering risks by insurance companies, hospital or medical
service companies, health maintenance organizations, and other similar entities that administer
benefit30plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (1994).
See Robert E. Keeton & Alan 1. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental
Principles,Legal Doctrines and Commercial Practices,§ 1.3(b)(2) (student ed. 1988), cited in
H. Miriam Farber, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided
Health Care Plans Violate the Americans With DisabilitiesAct?, 69 N.Y.t), L. Rev. 850. 863
(1994).3
6See 42 U.S.C. § 12202(c) (1994).
307
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") preempts state
regulation of health insurance with respect to self-insurers. 42 U.S.C. §12202(c); see also,
FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61-65 (1990).
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After discussing the weight of the EEOC Interim Guidance regarding
the ADA's application to health insurance, this section addresses
disability-based distinctions, the definition of "bona-fide," state law
provisions (or the lack thereof), and finally, a source of great debate the proper definition of "subterfuge."
The Proper Weight to Grant Agency Guidelines in General and the
EEOC Interim Guidance in Particular
In 1993, Congress permitted the EEOC to issue regulations 3to
implement the ADA. 30 3 The EEOC promulgated guidance provisions 6')
dubbed "Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health
Insurance" (Interim Guidance) relating to disability-based distinctions
and to the safe-harbor provisions of the ADA. 3 10 The Interim Guidance
discusses in great detail issues that rest at the core of this article, such
as disability-based distinctions and "subterfuge." 311 Therefore, this
subsection will atteipt to illustrate coherently the current status of an
incoherent issue: the proper degree of judicial deference to accord to
agency guidelines in general and to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance in
particular, after the Supreme Court's312landmark decision in Chevron i'
NaturalResources Defense Council.
Administrative agencies formulate both "legislative rules" such as
regulations, and "non-legislative" rules or "guidelines" such as agency
policy statements and interpretive rules. 313 Regulations generally fill in
statutory gaps. Gilidance documents typically enhance the consistency
and accountability of agency decisions by explaining the regulating
agency's perspective regarding the manner in which regulated
3

SSe 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).

"0 The EEOC enacted its Interim Guidance as a response to the Fifth Circuit'; dee,':on
in McGann v. H & H Music Co.. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991). '.hich held that ERISA failed to
prohibit employers from modifying benefits and from placing cover-ae li,mitt on conditions
such as AIDS.
See Eric Mills Holmes. Solving the Insurance kCnLItt Fa r Unflr
DiscriminationDilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project. "5 KY. L. 503. 619 n 375
(Spring311996-1997).
OSee Interim Guidance, supranote 80.
311

'ee id

3 12

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc.. 47 U S S37

(1984).313
See, e.g., John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emptin P1 .Stats Banzl#:C
Law, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 265-66 (1999): KENNETH CL-P DAViS & RICIIAt,*J.
PIERCF, JR., ADMINISTRAnVE LAW TREATISF. at § 6.3 (3d. ed. 1994)
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industries should comply with the applicable statutes and
regulations. 3 14 Unlike regulations, "non-legislative" rules do not
require an agency to conduct "notice and comment" proceedings3 15 -a
time-consuming process that mandates an agency to solicit public
opinion regarding the agency's proposal.
Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Chevron addressed the proper weight
that courts must impart to agency regulations, and arguably, to agency
guidelines. 3 16 With an agency regulation at issue, the Chevron majority
promulgated a two-step test for courts to conduct when evaluating an
agency's interpretation of a statute. 31 7 First, if the statute is clear, the
agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." 318 Second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court
if it "is based on a permissible
must defer to the agency interpretation
319
statute."
the
of
construction
While an agency regulation was at stake in Chevron, the Supreme
Court failed to contrast "legislative" and "non-legislative" rules. 3 20 In
fact, the Court made no mention of the formal rule-making process
undergirding a regulation.32 1 Because the Chevron case concerned a
"legislative" rule, however, courts and commentators debate whether
322
interpretive rules and guidelines garner "full Chevron deference."
To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed Chevron's
applicability to agency guidance. 323 Inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits
regarding the proper deference to confer upon agency guidelines, due to
314

See, e.g., George B. Wyeth, The "Regulation by Guidance" Debate: An Agency
Perspective, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv. 52, 52 (Spring 1995); Marianna E. Beem, Good
Guidance Improves Regulation: A Case Study with the FDA, 15 No. 4 ALA. NEws 23. 23
(1996).
3
5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (1994).
31'See
6

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
See id.

317

3
3 1sSee
19

id. at 843.
See id.

320

See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.

32 1

See id.

322

Duncan, supra note 313, at 266.
an excellent discussion on the Supreme Court's muddled doctrine on this issue,
see Britt E. Idle, To Defer or Not to Defer? The Circuit Split Over Chevron Deference to
Agency Interpretations: Southern lie Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 199S UTAH L.
REv. 397, 400-02.
3
23For
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the absence of an explicit Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue,
generate great
confusion among lower courts, agencies, and regulated
324
industries.

Several circuits, including the Second, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh,
District of Columbia, and Federal, grant Chevron deference 32to5
"legislative rules" but not to agency interpretations and guidelines.
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit furnishes Chevron deference to
"non-legislative" rules. 326 Judicial splits pervade the First, Third and
Sixth Circuits regarding the question
of Chevron deference to agency
3 27
interpretations and guidelines.

Strong policy justifications support both granting deference to
Chevron and to rendering Chevron inapposite, with respect to agency
guidelines. On one hand, restraining the judiciary, which has no

constituency, from substituting its policy preferences for those of the
executive branch, with a constituency via the President, supports
judicial deference to all agency promulgations. Consistency norms

among federal courts also entreat judicial deference to agiency
interpretations. Finally, agency expertise providing experienced insight
124See id.
32
5See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 316, 332-33 (101h Cir.
1997), citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. New York State Dep't of En%l. Con-zreation. 17
F.3d 521, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1994) (agency advisory circular does not command Cfbn'ron
deference); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cr. l91i' iazensn
interpretations are persuasive, but not controlling); Satellite Broad, & Comm, As 'n%Oman,.
17 F.3d 344, 346-47 (11th Cir. 1994) (granting Chevron deference to agency rule. after
previously rejecting similar policy decision); Travelstead v. Derv;instj. 978 F 2d 1244. 1250
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[A]gency pronouncements that are merely interpreti'.e are gven lzzr
deference.....); Vietnam Veterans v. Secretary of the Navy,343 F.2d 523. 537 tD C Cir I1 I
(agency
interpretations or policies do not bind the court).
326
See Warren v. N. C. Dept. of Human Resources, 65 F,3d 385. 391 14th Cir, 19951
(deference
accorded to the Secretary of Agriculture's interpretation of the lkwJ Stamp ActI
3 27
See United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1404 (1st Cir 1995) t"'h oh-ur
dele rence
is the proper criterion for determining whether a guideline. . .ontra~ene. a ,tatute~j.
Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996) ("policy statements. guadehne:, taf
instructions, and litigation positions" are not accorded full Chevron deferenceh. Elizabeth
Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 132 (3d Cir, 19951 ctdeference is
appropriate here even though the Secretary's interpretation is not contaned in a "legislative
rule' "); Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U. S. Nuc. Reg. Com'n., 399 F2d 719. 736 (3d Cir.
1989) ("NRC Final Policy Statement is entitled to no greater deference than any other paltcy
statement, i.e. none"); Garcia v. Secretary of Health and Human Sern icea, 4o F 3d 552. 557
(6th Cir. 1995) (deferring to the Secretary's statutory interpretation); 1celle. %. L-A. Dupont Dz
Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, S41-42 (6th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing deference U%%,eJ 1a1ene
rulemaking from agency policies).
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courts to dance the Chevron two-step
into the statute at issue implores
32 8
with "non-legislative" rules.
On the other hand, several commentators suggest that agency
interpretations and guidelines, which are not required to follow noticeand-comment procedures, should not garner complete judicial
deference. 329 This justification demands attention because if
"permissible statutory constructions" pursuant to Chevron - by way of
agency guidelines - surmount judicial review, agencies would lack the
incentive to conduct notice and comment procedures, which account
for public perspectives. 330 Further, the Tenth Circuit in Southern Ute v.
Amoco argued that systematic deference to agency interpretations
would relinquish a court's duty of judicial review and, concurrently,
undesirably tilt the constitutional separation of powers toward the
executive branch.33 '
In sum, if Chevron applies to agency interpretations and
guidelines that have not gone through notice and comment proceedings,
then agency guidance interpreting unclear statutes will harness
controlling weight if a court deems the agency's statutory construction
"permissible." If, however, a reviewing court renders Chevron
inapposite with respect to "non-legislative" rules, the Supreme Court's
332
1944 pre-Chevron decision in Skidmore v. Swift will likely apply.
The Skidmore majority stated that administrative "rulings,
interpretations and opinions.. .while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance." 333 Therefore, even if a reviewing court denies Chevron
deference to an agency's guidance, pursuant to Skidmore the court may
at least "resort" to the pronouncement.

328

See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
under Chevron, 6 ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 194 (1992).
Lawmaking
329
See id. at 189; Davis & Pierce, supra note 313, at § 3.5.
330
See Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 189 (Nygaard, J.,
dissenting).
33
'See Southern Ute, 119 F.3d at 833, cited in Idle, supra note 323.
" 2Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
333
1d. at 140.
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Chevron Applied to the EEOC Interim Guidance
The primary policy driving disallowance of Chevron deference to
agency interpretations rests on the basis that such agency guidelines
have not been proffered after consideration of the regulated public's

viewpoints pursuant to notice and comment procedures. -31 This policy,
however, generally fails to adhere to non-regulatory guidelines
extended by the EEOC because since the mid-1970s the EEOC has

issued several of its interpretive guidance pronouncements only after
conducting notice and comment procedures.- 35 For example the EEOC
issued its Interpretive Appendix to the ADA - discussing, inter alii,

"major life activity" status - only after the EEOC conducted notice and
comment activity.336 The EEOC's notice and comment standards
regarding interpretive guidance abrogate the chief concern cited by
courts and commentators reluctant to grant Chevron deference to such

pronouncements. 337 Consequently, one may plausibly argue that EEOC
guidelines issued after notice and comment proceedings, unlike
guidelines proffered by many other agencies, should impart substantial

334

See supra note 312 and accompanying text.

335

The EEOC's conduct is in response to Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Ali 'rzrte
PaperCo. v. Moody, noting that the EEOC interpretation at issue garnered less deference than a
regulation because the "[g]uidelines in question have never been sublected to the te-:t
of
adversary comment" Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 US. 405, 44) l97511 BlacICmun, J.
concurring). See also Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC. tho Corts, and ElmpkL ,i win
Discrimination Policy. Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutort Intorp-ctaton.
1995 UTAHL. REv. 51. 103.
336
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
337
1f the EEOC follows notice and comment proceedings prior to promulqatmg maa. of
its guidance provisions, why not issue regulations, with guaranteed Clevron deference, rather
than guidance provisions with questionable Chevron deference? Christopher lNucliv!i,.
Director of the ADA Division of the EEOC, suggested that guidance provisions f icallN differ
from regulations; that is,
in guidance provisions, unlike in regulations. the EEOC provide5 large
amounts of specific information and explains in great detail the logic behind the EEOC's
pronouncements. Further, Mr. Kuczynski suggested that EEOC investigators and regulated
industry members form the primary audience for guidance provisions. though he do.s
recognize that the guidance provisions are helpful tools for courts and the public at large,
Finally, Mr. Kuczynski suggested that, as I argue above. regardless of r:licther wi agency
entitles a proclamation "guidance' or "regulation." if notice and comment przedim ha'.e
been conducted, the amount of deference a court grants the document should not %ary greatly
Telephone interview with Christopher Kuczynski, EEOC Di'ision Director of the Americanwith Disabilities Act (Nov. 15, 1999).
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weight on courts. Indeed, many courts have followed the 338EEOC's
Interpretive Appendix position regarding "major life activity."
Unlike many EEOC guidelines, however, the EEOC's Interim
Guidance, which tackles several key issues at stake in an ED-sufferers
quest for Viagra coverage - including disability-based distinctions and
"subterfuge" - has not gone through notice and comment
proceedings.339 Indeed, the EEOC intends the Interim Guidance to
provide rough guidance to regulated entities until it issues a final
guidance after publication for notice and comment. 340
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's Sutton decision obviated
consideration of the weight of the EEOC's Interim Guidance via its
"mitigating measures" determination. 341 Currently, the EEOC's
Interim Guidance rests in the same position as other guidance
provisions that have not undergone notice and comment proceedings waiting for a Supreme Court pronouncement on the level of Chevron
applicability. Agencies, regulated industries, and courts craving a
comprehensive Chevron doctrine also seek Supreme Court direction
regarding Chevron's applicability to agency guidance provisions that
have not weathered notice and comment activity. Because the proper
deference due to the EEOC's Interim Guidance lacks clarity, this
section will, inter alia, illustrate the positions proffered by this
pronouncement to provide a comprehensive view of the issues at stake.
Disability-Based Distinctions
Whenever a statutorily "disabled" claimant alleges that a provision of
an employer-provided health benefit plan violates the ADA, the EEOC
(and a reviewing court) must first determine whether the challenged
provision amounts to a disability-based distinction. 342 An employerprovided plan not resting on a disability-based distinction fails to
violate the ADA.343 Therefore, this subsection outlines the measures a
33

SSee, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America. Inc., 181 F3d 1220. 1227

(1 th Cir.
1999); Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, Texas, 176 F.3d 834. 836 (Sth Cir. 1999).
339
See generally Interim Guidance, supra note 80.
34 0
As early as May 8, 1995, the EEOC proposed to issue final guidelines, updating the
Interim Guidance. See 60 Fed. Reg. 24,040 (1995). On August 12, 1997. however, the EEOC
withdrew
the proposal from consideration. See 62 Fed. Reg. 58,201 (1997).
34 t
See supra notes 237-280 and accompanying text,
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
344242
3
1d.
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court presumably will undergo in determining whether an employer's
non-Viagra coverage policy constitutes a disability-based distinction.
The EEOC guidance provides a comprehensive mapping of
insurance distinctions that it deems "not based on disabilitv."," This
blueprint includes plans applied equally to all insured employees, even
if they may have a greater impact on some people with disabilities.-"
For example, the EEOC's guidance proffers that a health insurance plan
providing fewer benefits for "eye care" than for other physical
conditions fails to qualify as a disability-based distinction because such
a broad distinction applies to the treatment of "amultitude of dissimilar
conditions ...which constrain individuals both with and %vithout

disabilities." 346 The EEOC subsequently contrasts such non disabilitybased distinctions xvith distinctions it deems disability-based, proposing
"[a] term or provision is 'disability-based' if it singles out a particular
disability (e.g., deafness, AIDS, schizophrenia), a discrete group of
disabilities (e.g., cancers, muscular dystrophies, Iddney diseases) or a
disability in general (e.g., non-coverage of all conditions that
substantially limit a major life activity).

347

Presumably a court

following the EEOC guidance will deem ED more similar to deafness
or kidney diseases than to the broad category of general eye care.
Therefore, an employer-provided health insurance plan failing to cover
ED remedies such as Viagra likely constitutes a disability-based
distinction pursuant to the EEOC's guidance.
Rather than explicitly precluding Viagra, or ED aids in general,
many health plans may exclude coverage for "infertility" assistance as
a whole.34 8 In mandating state Medicaid programs to provide Viagra
for qualified applicants, the HCFA determined that Viagra does not
qualify as a fertility-promoting drug.349 A court following the HCFA's
344

" See Interim Guidance, supra note SO.
345See Interim Guidance, supra note 80, at 405:7117. The EEOC Interim Gurdanc: alko
states that disability-based distinctions do not include: blanket pre-e.isting condition claure:.
or all
universal limits or exclusions from coverage of all experimental drugs and treatmentc.

"elective surgery;" and coverage limits on medical procedures that are not e~clu itel.,or
nearly exclusively, utilized for the treatment of a particular disability, such as a limit on X-ra'.
See id.346
at 405:7118.
The EEOC suggests, however, that an employer selectively applying a uni'.er.i'l nondisability
34 based distinction only to individuals with disabilities violates the ADA, SIL
'See id.
34S 4 2 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
49
3

id.
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determination likely would conclude that, since infertility drugs fail to
comprise Viagra, an employer must cover the wonder-drug. In

contradistinction, a reviewing court not aligning its judgment to adhere
to the HCFA's intuition but rather determining that "infertility"
comprises ED, must decide whether the broad category of "infertility"
35 Certainly, heated
more closely mirrors eye care or kidney diseases.
35 1
question.
debate will surround resolution of this
Bona Fide Benefit Plan
An employer-provided health benefit plan deemed to comprise a
disability-based distinction must fall within the protective ambit of the
ADA's safe harbor provision; otherwise it violates the ADA.352 The
first prong of the safe harbor test requires an employer-provided benefit
plan (traditional or via self-insurance) to meet the statutory standard "bona fide."
The ADA fails to define the term "bona fide." 353 An age nondiscrimination statute preceding the ADA, the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),354similarly employed (and failed to
350
See
351

WEBSTER'S II, supra note 123.
The Eighth Circuit's 1996 decision in Kraud v. Iowa Methodist Aedical Center
considered the disability-based distinction status of a benefit plan's broad infertility exclusion.
Mary Jo Kraul's employer-provided medical benefit plan excluded coverage for the treatment
of male or female infertility problems. Denied coverage for her fertility treatments, Kraul
brought suit under the ADA. The Eighth Circuit, before the Supreme Court's Bragdon
decision, determined that reproduction failed to qualify as a statutory "major life activity," and
therefore concluded that the ADA term "disability" did not comprise infertility, and
consequently, an insurance provision denying fertility treatment coverage was deemed not a
disability-based distinction. Clearly, by stating that infertility fails to constitute an ADA
"disability," a plan denying coverage for infertility lacks the precursor to a disability-based
distinction decision - the disability - relegating any discussion pertaining to a fertility-noncoverage clause's status as a disability-based distinction to dicta. Notably, however, the Eighth
Circuit followed the EEOC's guidance, and stated that the plan's infertility exclusion "does not
single out a particular group of disabilities, allowing coverage for some individuals with
infertility problems, while denying coverage to other individuals with infertility problems."
Yet, it seems that the court unexplainably applied a discrimination analysis by looking at
numbers within a categorically excluded group of disabilities, rather than determining whether
the discrete group itself is distinguished as a plain reading of the EEOC guidance suggests,
Regardless, Bragdon renders Kraul practically inapposite. See Kraul v. Iowa Methodist
Medical Center, 95 F.3d 674 (8t" Cir. 1996).
35242
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
35 3
id.

31429 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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'
define) the term "bona fide employee benefit plan."355
EEOC
regulations interpreting the ADEA state: "[a] plan is considered 'bona
fide' if its terms .. have been accurately described in writing to all
employees and if it actually provides the benefits in accordance with
the terms of the plan." 356 The Supreme Court, in two ADEA cases United Airlines v. Mickfann 357and Public Employees Retirement v.
Betts35S - suggested a statutorily qualified "bona fide" benefit plan -[is
one that] exists and pays benefits." While the Me61fann and Betts
decisions form the root from which great controversy stems in the
"subterfuge" debate (discussed later in this section of the article), the
Courts' definition of "bona fide" generates little discussion. Unlike in
the "subterfuge" context, courts deciding cases have embraced the
McMann/Betts' definition of ADEA term "bona fide" for ADA
purposes. 359 Further, the EEOC's ADA guidance qualifies a health
insurance plan as bona fide if "it exists and pays benefits, and its terms
have been accurately communicated to eligible employees."-' 1; In sum,
the "bona fide" prong of the § 501(c) safe harbor provision lacks bite;
at most, to satisfy this requirement an employer-provided health plan
need only actually exist, have been accurately communicated to
beneficiaries, and pay benefits to plan members.

Not Inconsistent with State Law
Only employers purchasing traditional insurance plans that encompass
a disability-based distinction must satisfy the "not inconsistent with
state law" prong of ADA § 501(c). The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts
state regulation of health
361
self-insurers.
to
respect
insurance with
While varying in substance, all states require that employers
provide certain benefits for employees. For example, Kansas state law
mandates coverage for services performed by optometrists, dentists,
...
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2)(B) (1994).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b) (199S).
357
. United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 194 (1977),
35sOhio Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. BetLs. 492 U,S. 153. It ( 19"9)
3 59
" See, e.g., Kraul, 95 F. 3d at 67S: Conner v. Colony Lake Lure. 1997 WL 1651 I. at
3 56

*9 (W.D. N.C.). Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 3S7 F. Supp. I1106. 1120 (C D 111I9451
36OInterim Guidance, supra note SO,at 405:7120.
6142 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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and podiatrists. 362 Several states obligate insurers to cover, or to offer
employers the option of covering, infertility diagnoses and treatments
such as in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination. 363 Additionally,
several states recently enacted legislation mandating insurance
coverage for contraceptives: Maryland in 1998, and Connecticut,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Vermont in 1999.364 As of this article's writing, however, no state law
positively requires
private employers to purchase Viagra for
365
employees.
Subterfuge
The final prong of the ADA's safe harbor provision - that an employer
offering its employees an insurance plan with a disability-based
distinction must meet to avoid liability under the ADA - musters a
tremendous amount of controversy. 366 Applicable to both traditional
and self-provided coverage, this prong mandates that a disability-based
distinction "shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the ADA.], 3 67 Two distinct lines of thought dominate case law,
agency regulations, and commentary regarding the proper interpretation
of the term "subterfuge." One group of "subterfuge" analysts suggests
that "subterfuge" under the ADA appropriates the definition of
"subterfuge" under the ADEA that the Supreme Court adopted in
Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts.368 Others
362

See

363

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-2,100 (1998).

The state laws of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas provide widely varying
mandates to cover or to offer to cover services such as infertility diagnoses and certain
infertility treatments. For a comprehensive delineation of each aforementioned state's
requirements, see Insurance Laws by State, at http://vww.poetsrx.com/insurance/state.htm (last
modified May 5,1999).
3
'6See Richard Wolf, Legislatures in 45 States Saw Abortion Bills in '99, USA TODAY.
July 6, 365
1999, at 10A.
1n September 1998, the Florida Division of State Employee Insurance decided that
Florida's state insurance plan will cover eight Viagra pills per month for state employees if
deemed medically necessary. See Bill Cotterell, FloridaState Workers' Insurance Limited to
Eight Viagra Pills Per Month, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS: "rALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,

September 15, 1998.
3
66One commentator has dubbed "subterfuge" as "one of the thorniest issues presented
by the ADA." See Farber, supra note 305, at 915.
36742 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
36

See Betts, 492 U.S. 158.
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believe that the EEOC's Interim Guidance definition of -subterfuge"
controls. The dispute over the governing definition of "subterfuge" as
used in the ADA remains unsettled. Because this debate heavily
impacts an analysis regarding the refusal of employers to provide
Viagra for employees, this subsection delineates each position
thoroughly.
Public Employees Retirement Systen of Ohio v Betts
The ADEA prohibits arbitrary discrimination by public and private
employers against employees on account of age." ,j Specifically,
ADEA § 4(f)(2) only permits age-based employment decisions made
pursuant to the terms of "any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a .subter/fie to
evade the purposes of [the ADEA]."" 7 o In Belts, the State of Ohio
established a retirement benefits program for state and local
government employees titled the Public Employees Retirement System
of Ohio (PERS). 37 1 The appellee Betts, a 61-year-old county-employed
speech pathologist suffered severe medical conditions after 17 years of
employment, which necessitated her retirement. 372 PERS allocated
373
greater benefits to disabled retirees than to non-disabled retirees.
Only individuals under the age of 60, however, qualified for disability
retirement benefits.374 Because of Betts' age at retirement, PERS
denied Betts disability retirement benefits despite her medical
condition. 375 Consequently, PERS allocated Betts S158.50 per month.
$196.50 per month less than she would have received under a disability
retirement scheme. 376 Betts filed suit, claiming that PERS' refusal to
grant her application for disability retirement benefits violated the
ADEA.37 7 Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the Betts decision hinged
7
on the Courts' construction of the statutory term "subterfuge." 3
6929 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
37029 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
371
Betts, 492 U.S. at 162.
"-See idat 163.
3

See id

37

375See

id

See id

376

Betts, 492 U.S. at 163.

377

See id at 164.
373
See id at 166.
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The Betts Court initially looked to the Supreme Court's first
construal of "subterfuge" under the ADEA.379 While validating a
mandatory retirement provision on the basis of age in United Air Lines
v. McMann, the Supreme Court discussed the ADEA's "subterfuge"
provision. 380 After rejecting an assertion that only a business or
economic basis for an age based distinction justifies a "no subterfuge"
determination, the McMann Court held subterfuge entails "a scheme,
plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion," which connotes a specific
"intent ...to evade a statutory requirement." 381 Pursuant to this
definition, the McMann Court characterized the plan at issue as "not a
subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the Act, since the plan's
enactment predated the ADEA.3a2 In 1978, one year after the MeMann
decision, Congress amended the ADEA to nullify the McMann Court's
validation of mandatory retirement based on age. 383 Congress, however,
chose not to amend the ADEA's "subterfuge" language. 384 Therefore,
the Betts Court determined that McMann Court's "subterfuge"
definition under the ADEA remained good law.
Further, the Betts majority concluded that to constitute a
statutorily-prohibited "subterfuge," an ADEA claimant must prove that
an age-based distinction intentionally discriminates in a non-fringe
benefit aspect of the employment relation.385 The Court rationalized
this holding in the following manner: ADEA § 4(a)(1) prohibits
discrimination by employers with respect to, inter alia, compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; 386 ADEA § 4(f)(2) only
permits age-based employment decisions made pursuant to a bona fide
employee [fringe] benefit plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the ADEA; 387construing the term "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" of § 4(a)(1) to encompass
employee benefit plans of the type covered by § 4(f)(2), renders §
37 9

See id.
SSee McMann, 434 U.S. at 192.
3S'See id. at 203 (emphasis added).
32
See id.
383
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 95-256, §2(a), 92
3

Stat. 189 (1978).
384
385See

Betts, 492 U.S. at 176.
See id. at 176, 181.
38629 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
38729 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1994).
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4(f)(2) nugatory with respect to post-ADEA plans. Therefore, writing
for the majority in Betts, Justice Kennedy concluded ADEA § 4(fg2)
exempts all age-related policies other than
ones that intentionally
3 SS
manner.
benefit
non-fringe
a
in
discriminate
Employer-provided health insurance plans constitute fringe
benefits.S 9 Therefore, if the Betts' "subterfuge" decision applies with
equal force to the "subterfuge" provision of the ADA, an employerprovided plan refusing to supply Viagra to employees will fall .ithin
the safe harbor provision of the ADA. Congressional action and several
cases suggest Betts' "subterfuge" decision fully applies to the ADA.
Congress overruled Betts one year after its decision by amending §
4(f)(2) of the ADEA in the course of passing the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) of 1990.'o The OWBPA clarified
the ADEA's proscription against age discrimination by stating that
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'"
comprise all employee benefits, including such benefits provided
pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan.3"" This Act
unmistakably overturns the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding in
Betts and revives the ADEA's original purpose - to eliminate arbitrary
age discrimination in all facets of the workplace.39 2 To further that
purpose, the OWBPA eliminated the employee benefit plan exemption
under § 4(f)(2), thereby removing the term "subterfuge."
One could contend that Congress understood the Betts Court's
interpretation of "subterfuge" because it removed the poisonous term
upon enactment of the OVBPA. 393 Therefore, arguably, by including
"subterfuge" in the ADA - a statute enacted at almost precisely the
same time as the OWBPA's passage - Congress intended the ADA
term "subterfuge" to imitate the Betts definition.,'
Some
3

SSSee Betts, 492 U.S. at 174.

3S92 9 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (b)(198S).
3 0

9 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101433, 104 Slat, 9733 1990)
[hereinafter OWBPA].
39'29 U.S.C. § 630(1) (1994).
392
See S. REP.No. 101-263, at 16-17 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U S.C ,AN
N 15609. 15211522.
393
See generally OWBPA, supra note 390.
34
' See Farber. supra note 305. at S96-97 The O\WBPA bills. remo an the 'b:erfize"
terminology, were introduced in Congress on August 3 and 4. 1939. onl tvo dl , altcr the
.subterfuge' language was added to the Senate Labor Committee's draft [of the ADAI-')

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 4:73

commentators, however, indicated one could argue that Congress, by
rejecting Betts' "subterfuge" definition for ADEA purposes, effectively
rejected an identical definition as applied to the ADA. 395 Further, it
seems probable that if the Supreme Court ever interprets the ADA's
"subterfuge" provision, with Congress' OWBPA reprimand in mind, it
will not make the same mistake twice. Further yet, even if the Supreme
Court determines that the Betts' "subterfuge" decision applies to the
ADA, Congress could subsequently supersede such a rule, so as to
revive the ADA's original purpose - to eliminate arbitrary disability
discrimination.
Notwithstanding the OWBPA's admonishment, three United
States courts of appeal to date have determined that the Betts
interpretation of "subterfuge" applies to the ADA.396 The Third Circuit
in Ford v. Schering Plough determined that because Congress passed §
501(c) of the ADA in 1990 and the Supreme Court decided Betts in
1989, Congress, in enacting the ADA, presumptively adopted the
Supreme Court's ADEA interpretation of "subterfuge." "' The Ford
majority stated: "[w]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law
incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be
presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the
38
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." 9
Similarly, in Modderno v. King, the D.C. Circuit held that the Betts
definition of subterfuge applies to § 501(c) of the ADA. 39 ' The court
reasoned, "when Congress chose the term 'subterfuge' for the
insurance safe harbor of the ADA, it was on full alert as to what the
Court understood the word to mean.. ,400 The Eighth Circuit in Kraul
395

See Linda M. Laarman, The Effect of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct on Health
and Other Employee Benefit Plans, 50 SUPPLEMENT INST. ON FED. TAX'N, at 1,25 (1992);
Lawrence 0. Gostin & Alan I. Widiss, What's Wrong With the ERISA Vacumn? Einplovers,
Freedom to Limit Health Care Coverage Providedby Risk Retention Plans, 269 JAMA 2527.
2531 (1993).
396
See infra notes 399-401 and accompanying text.
397
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corporation, 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998).
398d., citing, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978), See also Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) ("[W]here words are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country, they are
presumed
399 to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."),
Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
4
.See id.
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v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center adopted
Modderno 's reasoning and
40 1
followed Betts in an ADA construction.
The EEOC'sPosition
Adopted in 1993, the EEOC's Interim Guidance (construing the ADA)
rejects the Betts Court's ADEA interpretation of "subterfuge. ' 4 ' The
EEOC distinguishes the Betts majority's "non-fringe benefits" holding
by stating that, unlike the ADEA, the language of the ADA covers
"fringe benefits. 4 °3 The EEOC Interim Guidance then proceeds to
define "subterfuge" as "disability-based disparate treatment that is not
justified by the risks or costs associated
with the disability ... [as]
' 40 4
basis.
case-by-case
a
determined on
The EEOC Interim Guidance outlines a non-exhaustive list of
potential "business/insurance" justifications, regardless of intent to
discriminate, that save a disability-based distinction from acquiring the
designation "subterfuge." 405 The EEOC proffers that a plan fails to
reach the 40level
of "subterfuge" if an employer proves any of the
6
following:

(a) that it has not engaged in the disability-based
disparate treatment alleged because it actually treats
40t

See Kraul,95 F.3d at 679.
2See Interim Guidance, supra note 80, at 405:7119.
403
See id at 405:7119 n.10.
4
4See id at 405:7120.
40 5
See id.
40
The EEOC places the burden on the defendant-employer to probe that a diab:litybased distinction in an employer-provided health insurance plan is not a "subterfuge e
Interim Guidance, supra note 80, at 405:7119. The EEOC suggests that placinp the burden on
the employer comports with "the well established principle that the burden of proof should rest
with the party who has the greatest access to the relevant facts." Soo id. The Eighth Circuit in
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum implicitly endorses this position, See Hendercon % Bojline
Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (SL' Cir. 1995). In Botts. hovever, the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff filing an action under the ADEA bears the burden of proving that an a'-baLed
distinction in an employer-provided benefit plan constitutes a "subterfuge _Y-e Botts. 492 U S,
40

at 162. The Betts Court made this decision by analogizing § 4(f12) of the ADLA to ! 7031h)
of Title VII, the statute from which the prohibitions of the ADEA r.ere deried B
lau
te
i
Supreme Court held that the Title VII plaintiffs bear the burden of pro ng din
_cfjmiatton
pursuant to § 703(h), see Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc,, 490t t S 'Jd I, '
l9[. the
Betts Court likewise determined that ADEA plaintiffs bear the burden of probing that
employer-provided benefit plans amount to a "subterfuge." The Third Circuit hia applied the
Betts burden of proof conclusion to the ADA. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 615-
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all similarly catastrophic conditions in the same
way;
(b) that the disability-based disparate impact is justified
by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or
reasonably anticipated experience, and that
conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or
experience are treated in the same fashion, in other
words, the disability-based disparate impact is
risk classification and
based on 4legitimate
07
underwriting;
(c) that the disparate treatment is necessary to ensure
that the health plan is fiscally sound, that is,
continued unlimited coverage would be so
expensive as to cause the health insurance plan to
become financially insolvent;
(d) that the challenged insurance plan is necessary to
prevent an unacceptable change in plan coverage or
plan premiums - such a change is a drastic increase
in premium payments (or in co-payments or
deductibles), or a drastic alteration to the scope or
level of benefits provided that would: 1) make the
insurance plan effectively unavailable to a
significant number of other employees, 2) make the
plan so unattractive as to result in adverse
selection, 40 8or 3) make the plan so unattractive that
the employer cannot compete in recruiting and
maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority
407

"Riskclassification refers to the identification of risk factors and the grouping of those

factors that pose similar risks. Risk factors may include characteristics such as age, occupation,
personal habits (e.g. smoking), and medical history. Underwriting refers to the application of
the various risk factors or risk classes to a particular individual or group (usually only if the
group is small) for the purpose of determining whether to provide insurance." See Interim
Guidance,
408 supra note 80, at 405:7121 n.15.
"Adverse selection is the tendency of people who represent poorer-than-average
health risks to apply for and retain health insurance to a greater extent than people who
represent average or above average health risks." See id. at 405:7121 n. 16.
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of plans offered by other employers in the

community; [or]
(e) that the treatment desired has no benefit (e.g., no
medical value).409
If an ED-stricken individual qualifies as ADA "disabled," if his

employer's health policy refusing to cover Viagra comprises a
disability-based distinction, 410 and if a court deems that the EEOC
guidance applies, then an ED sufferer's final obstacle impeding
recovery - the "subterfuge" decision - will likely turn on a test similar
to one delineated in example (b). 4 1 1 For sake of completeness,
however, each example will be briefly discussed.

A plan that "treats all similarly catastrophic conditions in the same
way" fails to comprise a disability-based distinction. Therefore,
example (a) is superfluous since the safe harbor provision, including its

"subterfuge" prong, need only rescue plans embracing disability-based
412
distinctions.
Example (b) closely aligns with Justice Marshall's dissent in
Belts:4 13 it '4 propounds
a "business purpose" interpretation of
"subterfuge.' 4 Example (b) also mirrors the district court cases
detailed below that reject Betts' "subterfuge" definition in an ADA
context. By virtue of states' widespread adoption of mandated coverage
of specified health benefits, the "business purpose" test for
"subterfuge" favors employees. State-required coverage of any health
benefits as expensive as, or more expensive than, Viagra eliminates an
employer's saving grace - that "conditions with comparable actuarial
4

0'See id at 405:7120-7121 (emphasis added).
This argument assumes that the plan qualifies as both bona fide (for both traditional
and self-insurance plans) and not inconsistent with state law tfor traditional insurance plans
only). 4 1
'See Interim Guidance, supra note 80. at 405:7121 n. 16.
4 12
See Managed Care Financial Incentives to Withhod or Dokwli'.'atnw t V!a Il to
Americans With Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, 21 NO. 2 Is LmIci REP 55 JlJ9
[hereinafter
FinancialIncentives].
4 13
Justice Marshalls' dissent in Betts comports %ith several pr.l-itlts circuit courts of
appeal decisions. See e.g., EEOC v. ML Lebanon. S42 F2d 1480. 14," 13d Cir 193.0; Izarhn
v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1988) Cipriano %. Board of Lducalton of Nonh
Tonawanda
School District, 785 F.2d 5!, 57-5S {2d Cir. 19S6).
41 4
See Betts, 492 U.S. at 185.
410
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data and/or experience are treated in the same fashion." 4' 5 Therefore,
under the Interim Guidance, if an employer's benefit plan covers
conditions with comparable actuarial data as ED, but not ED-aiding
medicine such as Viagra, then the policy constitutes a "subterfuge"
under EEOC example (b) and consequently falls outside of the ADA's
safe harbor provision.4 16 For example, commentators examining this
issue suggest that plans covering heart disease treatment, but not care
for mental disabilities with a proven biological basis, 417 or plans
providing pacemakers, but not furnishing cochlear implants for the
hearing impaired, 4 8 falter under an actuarial comparison test such as the
one illustrated in EEOC example (b).
It seems highly unlikely that Viagra coverage could lead to a
situation similar to one illustrated in EEOC example (c). Employers
either by increasing co-payments
may alter plans to prevent insolvency,419
or deductibles or by capping benefits.
At first blush, example (d) seems to present some concern to an
ED-stricken individual attempting to reach a judicial determination that
his employer's non-Viagra-coverage health plan constitutes an ADA
"subterfuge." In light of the financials cited by Aetna as disclosed
above, however, example (d) appears quite impertinent. Under the
Aetna plan, employer costs depend on the number of Viagra pills
provided monthly, as well as the level of co-payment required. Aetna
estimates that with a 50% co-pay an Aetna-insured employer with one
hundred workers spends $1,884 per year to cover six Viagra pills every
thirty-four days, that is, $18.84 per worker, annually. 420 Assuming the
worst from an employee's perspective - that an employer reduced each
41

See FinancialIncentives, supra note 412.
Does "comparable" actuarial data regard total or individual costs? That is. does an
illness with a lifetime treatment cost of$18,000 per individual, and a prevalence rate of one in
twenty-five individuals "compare" with an illness with an individual lifetime cost of $120,000
and a three out of 500 prevalence rate? See Steven Eisenstat. Capping Health Insurance
Benefits for AIDS: An Analysis of Disability-Based Distinctions under the Americans with
Disabilities
Act, 10 J.L. & POL. 1, 35-36 (1993).
4
"See Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative "Subterfuge"?: Failing to Insure Persons
with Mental Illness under the Mental Health ParityAct and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 504 VAND.
L. REV. 753, 781 (1997)
18 ee Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 939,
n.171 (1997).
419
See id.
420
See Levick, supra note 33.
416
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employee's annual salary by $18.84 to offset Viagra coverage - it
seems highly implausible that such a change could make a health plan
effectively unavailable, or so unattractive as to result in adverse
selection or in a recruitment disaster. Further, if a court determines that
one employer must cover Viagra, then other employers if pushed by
ED-stricken claimants may follow suit, further rendering example (d)
inapposite. 421
Example (e) appears quite immaterial. Few plaintiffs will seek
coverage for treatment providing no benefit.
Pursuant to a judicial determination that the EEOC Interim
Guidance controls a "subterfuge" analysis, an ED sufferer maintains
very strong arguments that his employer's non-Viagra-coverage plan
fails to fall within any of the business/insurance justifications illustrated
by the EEOC. While three United States courts of appeal construe
"subterfuge" under the ADA in a manner identical to the Bets
interpretation under the ADEA, several lower courts have taken an
approach closer to the EEOC's reading of "subterfuge." Additionally,
the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, as discussed
above, may
422
weight.
substantial
Guidance
Interim
EEOC's
the
provide
In Cloutier v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, the
District Court for the Northern District of California determined: (1)
subterfuge does not require malicious intent; and (2) similar to EEOC
example (b), to avoid subterfuge an insurer's underwriting decisions
must be in accord with either sound actuarial principles or actual or
reasonably anticipated experience. 423
The court based these
determinations on statements supporting the ADA made by senior
members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 4"4 Such
remarks noted "subterfuge" does not imply that a court must find
"malicious intent" on the part of the insurer to make the latter liable

421

Because EEOC example (d) suggests that unacceptable alteration to cocrae phns

include ones making the health insurance plan effectively unavailable to , 'igmtlant numh.r
of other employees, I assume that requiring co-payments by Vigra u
t;llit) o plc ,ttl a
plan within
the ambit of example (d).
4
2Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Defense Res. Defense Council. 467 U N C13711 924j
4
2Cloutier v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 964 F Supp 29'). 31.4 JND
Cal. 1997).
42 4
1
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under the ADA, 425and the subterfuge provision assures an insurer's
"refusal, limitation [of coverage], or rate differential is based on sound
actuarial principles, or is related to actual or reasonable anticipated
experience. ' 426 Pursuant to its "subterfuge" interpretation, the court
denied Prudential's summary judgment motion based on the ADA's
safe harbor provision because Prudential offered no actuarial or other
its outright rejection of the plaintiffs policy
data to justify
42 7
application.
In Doukas v. Met Life, the District Court for the District of New
Hampshire distinguished "subterfuge" under the ADA from
"subterfuge" as defined by the Betts majority's interpretation of the
ADEA. 42 The Doukas opinion quotes a pre-ADA House Committee
report to illustrate Congressional intent regarding the ADA term
"subterfuge": "[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage
based on classification of risk would be allowed ... the plan may not
refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount,
extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a
different rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or
mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate
differential is based on sound actuarial principals or is related to actual
or reasonably anticipated experience." 429 Based on this legislative
history, in spite of Betts, the court concluded that while insurers retain
the ability to follow practices consistent with insurance risk
classification accepted under state law, these methods must stand on
sound actuarial principles or must relate to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience. 430 Further, because the legislative history
indicates nothing necessitating a finding of conscious43 1intent to
discriminate, the court deemed such a showing unnecessary.
42

See id., citing 136 CONG. REc. H4624 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep,
Edwards);
426 136 CONG. REC. S9697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy),
Cloutier,964 F.Supp. at 304, citing H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3 at 70. rcprinted in 1990
267, 493.
U.S.C.C.A.N.
427
See id.
42
sDoukas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 950 F. Supp. 422, 430-32 (D. N.H.
1996). 42 9
See id. at 431, citing H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3 at 136-137, reprinted in 1990
267, 419-20.
U.S.C.C.A.N.
430
See id.

43 1

See also Zamora-Quezada v. HealthTexas Medical Group of San Antonio. 34
F.Supp.2d 433, 442-44 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (seeking guidance from the EEOC Interim Guidance

20001

MUST EMPLOYERS PA YFOR VL4GRA?

Besides the general legislative history substantiating a "businessbased" interpretation of the ADA's "subterfuge" language, several
members of Congress specifically discounted the Supreme Court's
"subterfuge" definition in Betts for ADA purposes. For example,
Representative Henry Waxman of California stated, "the term
'subterfuge' in the ADA should not be read as the Supreme Court read
that term in Betts.' ' 32 The courts of appeal adopting the Betts'
"subterfuge" definition for ADA determinations, however, deemed the
legislative history unpersuasive because the Congress failed4 33to
explicitly reject the Betts interpretation in the language of the ADA.
In addition to a debatable legislative history argument regarding
whether to apply a "business-based" approach to a worldng definition
of "subterfuge," the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron debatably
lends credence to an adoption of the EEOC's guidance.4 34 Until the
clamoring of Chevron's progeny succeeds in obtaining a Supreme
Court decision directly addressing the proper role of guidance
provisions to fill out the Chevron doctrine, the EEOC Interim Guidance
in general, and the Guidance's "subterfuge" language in particular,
harness an unsettled degree ofjudicial deference.
Even if a court, perhaps following a Supreme Court decision in the
future, decides to grant "non-legislative" agency guidance Chevron
deference, the D.C. Circuit in Modderno suggested that the Interim
Guidance's "business purpose" construction of the ADA should not
amass any weight.435 The Modderno court cited the Supreme Court's
discussion in Betts regarding provisions proffered by the Department of
on Application of ADA to interpret "underwriting" and "classifying rist." and su~gsting that
a proper subterfuge analysis necessitates actuarial, statistical, and empirical data); Andcrzon '.

Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 772 (E.D. Te\. 1996) (,tging the
EEOC 432
guidance controlling weight).
See 136 CONG. REC. H4626 (daily ed. July 12, 1990). Soo also 136 Co*Q:G, REC.

S9697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 136 Co*NG. REC. H4624 (daily cd.
July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990)
(statement
433 of Rep. Owens).
See, e.g., Kraul, 95 F.3d at 679 ("Had Congress intended to reject the Betts
interpretation of subterfuge when it enacted the ADA, it could have done so c\prs.ily by

incorporating language for that purpose into the bill that Congress voted on and the Pre':ident
signed.").
434
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (noting that if a statute is ambiguous %,
ath respect to the
specific issue, the question for the Court is whether an agency answer isbaxcd on a permisible
construction
of the statute.)
43
SSee Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065.
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Labor (DOL). 36 The DOL took a position in the context of the ADEA
similar to the EEOC's cost-related definition of "subterfige" for ADA
purposes. 437 The DOL suggested "a plan or plan provision which
prescribes lower benefits for older employees on account of age is not a
'subterfuge' within the meaning of [29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)] provided
that the lower level of benefits is justified by age-related cost
considerations." 438 The DOL's position, however, even assuming
agency deference post-Chevron, failed to garner any weight from the
Supreme Court because the Betts majority deemed a cost-justification
requirement "at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."43 "
The D.C. Circuit held, in ordinary parlance and in dictionary
or
definitions, "subterfuge" refers to a "scheme, plan, stratagem,
440
purpose."
business
or
economic
"an
not
evasion,"
artifice of
Because the "subterfuge" provision of the ADA essentially
imitates the analogous ADEA phraseology, the D.C. Circuit in
Modderno concluded that the cases appear identical.44 ' Consequently,
as the Betts Court discounted the DOL's cost-justification requirement,
the Modderno majority discredited the EEOC's business justification
approach.442
By not defining the ADA term "subterfuge," Congress clearly left
the term's interpretation to the judicial system. If applied to the ADA,
the Betts interpretation of "subterfuge" in the ADEA context strongly
favors employers in disability discrimination suits stemming from nonViagra-coverage benefit plans. The Betts definition provides employers
a safe harbor from ADA liability as long they eschew intentional
discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to non-fringebenefit provisions. On the other hand, the EEOC guidance tasks
employers to maintain a legitimate "business" justification to exonerate
4 36

See
437

id.
See id.
41'29 C.F.R. 1625. 10(d) (1998).
4 39
Bets, 492 U.S. at 171, citing McMann, 434 U.S. at 202. Presumably Justice Kennedy
determined that an interpretation "at odds with the plain language of the statute itself" fills
Chevron's second step.
44oMcMann, 434 U.S. at 202.
44
'The court's sole distinction cut even more against agency interpretation uinder the
ADA. The court speculated that a useful actuarial calculation for physical and mental disability
is more442difficult to perform than a comparable computation based on age.
See Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1065.

2000]

MUST EMPLOYERS PAY FOR VIAGIM.?

their non-Viagra-coverage plans. Until the Supreme Court definitively
promulgates a firm definition of "subterfuge" in the ADA context, or at
least determines the proper weight to afford the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance (or similar agency guidance provisions), "subtertuge" will
continue to lie at the center of many ADA debates, including the one
illustrated in this article.
CONCLUSION
Employer-provided health insurance plans became a prominent and
important provision in employee compensation contracts immediately
after World War II in response to wage restrictions imposed by the
federal government. 443 These plans still maintain critical importance
in efforts to obtain and retain employees. Whether furnished via selfinsurance or through outside insurers, employers risk liability by
providing plans that fail to cover certain treatments or medications in a
manner potentially constituting disability discrimination under the
ADA. Viagra, a tremendously successful ED combatant, is one such
medication that demands the attention of employers concerned about
ADA liability in the context of employee health plans. Yet, under
current case law an ED-stricken man attempting to recover Viagra costs
from his employer faces a difficult battle.
Post-Bragdon,ED presumably qualifies as an ADA "impairment"
that affects the major life activity of reproduction, or alternatively.
sexual intercourse. The Supreme Court majority's position in Suton
regarding "mitigating measures," however, suggests that many ED
sufferers must foot their own Viagra bills. Negative side effects and.
arguably, economic impact may free some ED victims from paying for
Pfizer's wonder-drug. With the absence of a congressional amendment
to 'the ADA that effectively disarms the Sutton ruling, however, most
Viagra users will fail the "substantial limitation' prong of the three-part
disability test under the ADA, and consequently will be precluded from
ADA recovery. Further, no post-Chevron Supreme Court decision
directly addresses the proper weight to grant agency guidelines in
general or the EEOC's Interim Guidance in particular. Therefore, even
443

See Charles B. Lynch, The Americans with Disabilitcs Act on ikaelft
Employee Benefit Plans.50 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 561,569 (1993),

ml 0_,.r
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if an ED-stricken individual qualifies as "disabled" under the ADA,
both employers and employees remain in the dark with respect to the
ADA's "subterfuge" language, a term on which liability for an
employer's refusal to cover Viagra presumably hinges. As an
alternative to filling out the Chevron doctrine, a Supreme Court
discourse on the applicability of Betts to the ADA would clarify the
current confusion surrounding the term "subterfuge" as applied in the
disability discrimination realm. Until the Supreme Court tackles the
"subterfuge" conundrum in the context of the ADA, lower courts,
administrative agencies, employers, and employees will disagree about
the buzz-word's proper definition and about the applicability of the
ADA's safe harbor provision to ED-plagued individuals, if they are
judicially deemed statutorily "disabled."
This article does not propose to predict an outcome to a suit
similar to the one I have described, which I envision arriving in a
courtroom sometime soon. Instead, I offer insight to the potential path
and its obstacles that the plaintiff in such a suit will presumably
encounter. If, at the end of this rocky road, a court determines that
employers must purchase Viagra for their ED-stricken employees to
avoid ADA liability, then a new question arises: How many pills must
employers provide? I leave this question for another day.

